Leslislating in the Face of New Technology: Copyright Laws for the Digital Age by Morano, Michael F.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 20, Issue 4 1996 Article 9
Leslislating in the Face of New Technology:
Copyright Laws for the Digital Age
Michael F. Morano∗
∗
Copyright c©1996 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Leslislating in the Face of New Technology:
Copyright Laws for the Digital Age
Michael F. Morano
Abstract
This Note discusses the agendas and proposals of different countries with respect to copy-
right regulation in the digital age. Part I discusses the present state of copyright law in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the European Community. Part I also examines laws that have
developed in response to new technology. Part II considers the varying commentaries and pro-
posals addressing the promulgation of copyright law for digital technology. Part III argues that
the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Community should take their existing
copyright concepts and expand them to fit with digital technology. In addition, Part III maintains
that lawmakers should consider copyright infringement liability standards which are based on an
OSP’s knowledge of and ability to control infringing works appearing on online services. Finally,
this Note concludes that promulgation of copyright laws relating to the Internet is crucial to the
growth of online services and a necessary prerequisite to a global information infrastructure.
LEGISLATING IN THE FACE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY:
COPYRIGHT LAWS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE
Michael F. Morano*
Property law has, to be sure, undergone constant change ....
Its enduring mix of old and new, rife with uneasy tensions,
reflects more than an institution that has evolved over centu-
ries and across cultures; it reflects as well two often conflict-
ing objectives - promoting stability and accomodating
change - that property systems must serve.'
INTRODUCTION
Computer technology has advanced to a point where indi-
viduals on opposite sides of the world may instantaneously ex-
change information.2  By accessing online services 3 and the In-
ternet4  through accounts with online service providers5
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University. This Note is dedicated to my parents
for all their love and support throughout my years as a student.
1. JESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY xxxiii (3d ed. 1993).
2. See NICHOLAS BA,, INSIDE THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 16 (1995) (ex-
plaining scope and availability of services through one's computer); Information Infra-
structure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The
Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 8 (1995) [hereinafter White Pa-
per] (discussing benefits of new technology). The President of the United States, Bill
Clinton, formed the Information Infrastructure Task Force ("Task Force") in 1993 to
develop the U.S. plan for a National Information Infrastructure. Id. at 1. The former
U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Ronald H. Brown, chaired the Task Force, which consists
of representatives from federal organizations that are instrumental in the development
of information services. Id.
3. See BARAN, supra note 2, at 21-31 (explaining online services). Commercial on-
line services, like America Online ("AOL") and CompuServe, utilize a centralized com-
puter system or a number of closely linked systems to serve subscribers. Id. at 22. An
online service is not a global network. Id. An online service, however, may provide a
user with access to the Internet. John Carmichael, Comment, In Support of The White
Paper: Why Online Service Providers Should Not Receive Immunity From Traditional Notions of
Vicarious and Contributory Liability for Copyright Infringement, 16 Loy. LA ENT. L.J. 759 n.3
(1996). Online services offer a variety of features, including access to newspapers,
magazines, financial reports, sports information, and shopping services. BARAN, supra
note 2, at 23. In addition, users of online services may participate in discussions with
other subscribers. Id.
4. See BARAN, supra note 2, at 37-38 (describing Internet). In the late 1960s, U.S.
military researchers first developed the concept of the Internet when they attempted to
link computers from different areas of the United States. Id. at 38. The Internet
evolved from this idea into a "large and very free-form association of independent net-
works and computer systems .... ." Id. at 37-38. Today, through a mere telephone
connection, a computer user can access the Internet and freely move through its world-
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("OSPs"), individuals may use computers to obtain journals, arti-
cles, world news, and even transfer funds in their bank ac-
counts.' The acts of uploading 7 and downloading' further this
exchange of information. 9 This heightened access to informa-
tion, which can marketably improve one's quality of life,' ° also
creates a potential for abuse of intellectual property rights."
Bulletin board service' 2 ("BBS"), online service, and Internet
subscribers have used the new technology by illegally placing,
without the copyright owner's authorization, copyrighted materi-
wide collection of networks and systems. FT LAw & TAx, INTERNET LAW AND REGULA-
TION 1 (Graham J.H. Smith ed., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNET LAw]. Because of the
relative ease of obtaining information from computer systems all over the world, the
Internet is becoming a major medium of communication with an estimated 20 million
users. BARAN, supra note 2, at 36-37.
5. See Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for
Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in this New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1083, 1115
(1996) (stating that online service providers are content providers and access providers
whose customers use Internet); see also Kenneth D. Suzan, Comment, Tapping to the Beat
of a Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S. Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet,
59 ALB. L. Rv. 789, 808 (1995) (stating that AOL, Prodigy, and CompuServe are online
service providers).
6. BARAN, supra note 2, at 28. Computer users get "online" by connecting their
computers to a computer network via telephone lines. Id. at 18. Users may connect to
online services that furnish access to information databases that contain the texts of
thousands of newspapers, magazines, and journals. Id. at 28.
7. Id. at 18. Uploading is the process by which a user takes files from her com-
puter and transfers them to another computer system for access by other subscribers.
Id.
8. Id. Users may download programs and files from the online services. Id.
Downloading is the process of obtaining information from another computer and
transferring it to one's own computer. Id.
9. Id.
10. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 8-9 (stating that users of new information serv-
ices will better their lives through heightened access to entertainment, arts and humani-
ties, education, and political information).
11. See id. at 10 (highlighting risks to intellectual property rights when works are
placed on electronic information systems); see also CRAIGJOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 1
(3d ed. 1994) (defining intellectual property as "products of the mind" which are pro-
tected by law).
12. See BA , supra note 2, at 19 (discussing bulletin board services). Computer
owners possessing the essential communications software and hardware may operate a
bulletin board service ("BBS"). Id. BBSs are used for electronic posting of announce-
ments and correspondence between users. Id. A BBS's capacity for information is that
of the computer host. Id. Subscribers to a BBS access the system through a computer
telephone modem. Id. BBS operators charge users a fee for access to the system which
allows users to either upload or download information. Id. BBSs operate on a smaller
scale than online services, which may consist of hundreds of BBSs. Id. at 23. See also
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (explaining
operation of BBS).
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als online for other users to download.1 3 The users, by upload-
ing and downloading unauthorized materials, are denying copy-
right owners just compensation for public access to their
works.1
4
The Internet is a worldwide entity,1" and, as such, copyright
infringement on this system is an international problem.16 Ac-
cordingly, governments are considering the prospect, of reaching
international accord on the protection of intellectual property. 17
The exclusive right to digital transmissions18 of copyrighted
works and the distribution of copyrighted works were among the
issues that nations considered at the December 1996 meeting of
the World Intellectual Property Organization' 9 ("WIPO").2°
13. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. NetCom Online Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1365-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing unauthorized placement of copyrighted
materials onto BBS and Internet); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 683
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (explaining that subscribers, without permission, uploaded and
downloaded protected programs); Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554 (outlining illegal activi-
ties by subscribers to BBS).
14. See BARAN, supra note 2, at 144 (stating that authors are concerned with getting
just rewards for their efforts when their works appear on information networks).
15. See INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at I (acknowledging that Internet, with net-
works all over world, has undefinable boundaries).
16. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that international rules for protec-
tion of intellectual property must be promulgated in order to ensure successful devel-
opment of worldwide information superhighway).
17. See BNA Inc., Meeting Looks at Intellectual Property Protection in Western Hemisphere,
52 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. 392, 395 (1996) (outlining U.S. commitment to
reaching international agreements with respect to intellectual property rights in face of
technological advances); Commission of the European Communities, Follow-Up to the
Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM(96)
586 Final at 29-30 (Nov. 1996) [hereinafter Green Paper Follow-Up] (stating that
United States, European Community, Japan, Canada, and Australia are examining in-
ternational harmonization of copyright legislation regarding new technology).
18. See BARAN, supra note 2, at 17 (defining digital information as information
transmitted in digital form so that computers may be able to receive it). A unique
feature of digital transmissions enables an individual who receives the data to communi-
cate a response to the sender. Id.
19. See JoYcE ET AL., supra note 11, at 1007 (explaining that World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") functions as Secretariat of Berne Convention and
other international intellectual property agreements).
20. Peter H. Lewis, 160 Nations Meet to Weigh Revision of Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 1996, at Al. 160 nations gathered, in Geneva, Switzerland, from December 2 to
20, 1996, to discuss rights obtained by copyright in an age when protected works may be
digitized and distributed over worldwide computer networks. Id. As a result of the
conference, two treaties were developed with general provisions encompassing the dis-
tribution of works over the Internet. Seth Scheisel, Global Agreement Reached to Widen
Law on Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1996, at Al; see World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization Copyright Treaty, adopted by Diplomatic Conference on December 20, 1996
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Commentators question whether the United States is pre-
maturely considering international legislation regarding copy-
right infringement on the Internet.2 1 Those in favor of postpon-
ing international deliberation on the issue argue that lawmakers
in the United States have not yet completed legislation on the
subject.2 2 While Congress has not yet finalized intellectual prop-
erty legislation relating to the Internet and digital technology,23
proponents of international deliberations maintain that consid-
ering the issues in an international forum is a worthwhile en-
deavor.21 Moreover, in order to ensure the success of the infor-
mation superhighway,25 legal practitioners contend that legisla-
tors need to address the guidelines for international intellectual
property protection at the outset of the information superhigh-
way's development.2 6
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm> [hereinafter WIPO Copyright
Treaty] (outlining provisions for protection of literary and artistic works in light of new
technology); World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, adopted by Diplomatic Conference on December 20, 1996 <http://
www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/95dc.htm> [hereinafter WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty] (detailing protection of performers, producers of phonograms,
and broadcasting organizations in face of technological advancements). The treaties
represent the most critical changes in copyright law seen in the past 25 years and the
increased protection offered by their provisions will encourage creators to disseminate
their works over the Internet. Scheisel, supra, at Al.
21. BNA Inc., Panel Sees Examples of Online Copyright Infringement, Asks Who Should Be
Liable, 52 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYaGHTJ. 35, 38 (1996). The Digital Future Coalition
("DFC"), comprised of educators, school boards, academicians, libraries, and consumer
advocates, asserted that "the [Clinton] administration's Digital Agenda is premature for
WIPO consideration before the conclusion of Congressional action" on the question of
intellectual property rights in the digital environment. Id.
22. BNA Inc., supra note 17, at 394-95. For opposing viewpoints on the issue of
copyright infringement liability of online service providers, compare Carmichael, supra
note 3, at 787 (arguing in favor of certain U.S. common law liability standards) with
Nivia Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The
Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDozo ARTS & ENr. L.J.
345, 407 (1995) (stating that imposition of liability will thwart advancement of new
information services).
23. BNA, Inc., supra note 21, at 35.
24. See BNA, Inc., supra note 17, at 392 (discussing comments that consideration of
digital agenda by WIPO is not premature). Though advocating debate for an interna-
tional digital agenda, one scholar stated that it is not the proper time to "lock ourselves
into a particular legal regime either nationally or internationally." Id.
25. See BARAN, supra note 2, at xiii (stating that information highway is quickly
evolving technology). The Information superhighway, with the Internet as one of its
foundations, is still in the early stages of development. Id.
26. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that at February 1995 G-7 Ministe-
rial Meeting on Global Information Infrastructure, Ministers spoke in favor of early
consideration of intellectual property issues in order to insure adequate development
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This Note discusses the agendas and proposals of different
countries with respect to copyright regulation in the digital age.
Part I discusses the present state of copyright law in the United
States, the United Kingdom,° and the European Community.
Part I also examines laws that have developed in response to new
technology. Part II considers the varying commentaries and pro-
posals addressing the promulgation of copyright law for digital
technology. Part III argues that the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the European Community should take their ex-
isting copyright concepts and expand them to fit with digital
technology. In addition, Part III maintains that lawmakers
should consider copyright infringement liability standards which
are based on an OSP's knowledge of and ability to control in-
fringing works appearing on online services. Finally, this Note
concludes that promulgation of copyright laws relating to the
Internet is crucial to the growth of online services and a neces-
sary prerequisite to a global information infrastructure.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED
KINGDOM, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Copyright law gives individuals commercially valuable rights
in their creations. 7 Copyright legislators from all over the world
have always confronted a common problem of maintaining such
rights in the face of new technologies for reproduction and dis-
tribution of works.2 8 The United States, the United Kingdom,
and the European Community have all developed systems of
copyright that have grown with technological advances.2 9
of information superhighway); see also INErNET LAW, supra note 4, at 21 (explaining
that European Commission, in Green Paper entitled "Copyright and Related Rights in
the Information Society," proposed harmonization of intellectual property laws to in-
sure full development of information superhighway in Europe).
27. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 2 (explaining that copyright law gives copy-
right owners right to use and authorize use of copyrighted works).
28. See id. at 1 (stating that copyright law is form of legal adaptation to new tech-
nologies of reproduction and dissemination of human expression); PETER GROVES,
COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS LAw 1 (1991) (explaining that technological changes con-
stantly distort legislative framework of copyright law).
29. See, e.g., Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 4 (stat-
ing that European Community has developed copyright legislation in response to
changing technology).
COPYRIGHT LAWS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE
A. Copyright Philosophies
Countries that embrace the economic rationale for copy-
right law, like the United States and the United Kingdom,30 base
copyright legislation on an individual's economic incentive to
create copyrightable works."' A number of countries32 recog-
nize, in addition to economic rights, creators' moral rights in
their works.33 Moral rights, which are based on authors' rights
to control the moral character of their works, 4 provide creators
with additional controls over their materials which economic
rights do not offer.3 5
1. Economic Model of Copyright Law
In order to financially reward and stimulate creators to de-
velop works, copyright law grants them property rights36 in their
creations.3 7 The property rights, however, limit public access to
the copyrighted materials38 and may deprive the public of the
benefits associated with dissemination of copyrighted works.3 9
Consequently, the central problem legislators face when promul-
gating economic-based copyright law is finding a balance be-
tween the copyright holder's incentive to create and the public's
right to access the copyrighted works.40
30. See A. Michael Warnecke, Note, The Art of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: The
Postmodern-Art Challenge to the Copyright Law, 13 REv. LrrlG. 685, 697 (1994) (stating that
U.S. Constitution sets forth language mandating that copyright laws be structured to
provide creators with economic rewards for their works); GROVEs, supra note 28, at 1
(stating that U.K. copyright law exists to address economic problem of providing indi-
viduals with incentives to create).
31. Warnecke, supra note 30, at 697.
32. SeeJoYCE ET AL.., supra note 11, at 610 (explaining that several countries recog-
nize moral rights); Dan Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American
Revolution, 2 CLADozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 155, 156 (discussing development of moral
rights in France, Italy, and Germany).
33. Christine L. Chinni, Droit D'auter Versus the Economics of Copyright: Implications for
American Law of Accession to the Berne Convention, 14 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 145, 149
(1992).
34. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 610.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1997) (illustrating U.S. copyright statute's grant to
creators of exclusive property rights in copyrighted work).
37. Warnecke, supra note 30, at 698.
38. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 18.
39. Id.
40. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
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In the face of technological advances, legislators analyze
copyright law to assure that it continues to maintain a balance
between public access to works and the economic incentives for
authors to create."1 From its beginnings, the law of copyright
had to respond to changes in technology.42 The Internet, like
the printing press, represents another technological advance
which the law must address.4
3
2. Moral Rights Model of Copyright Law
A country's recognition of moral rights leads to a copyright
system that is more protective of authors than Anglo-American
systems." Unlike copyright law that is premised solely on the
economic rights of an artist, a moral rights regime allows cre-
ators to retain certain rights in their creations even after they
have transferred ownership of their economic rights to others.45
Moral rights address the inalienable and natural rights of artists
that are related to their characters and may supersede economic
interests in the work.46 Some examples of moral rights include
41. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 7, 14 (stating that copyright law has to respond
to new technologies and maintain existing balance between incentive to create and
dissemination of works); GROVES, supra note 28, at 1 (explaining that legislation needs
to accommodate technological changes to maintain proper tradeoff between public ac-
cess to works and incentive to create).
42. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 1 (stating that idea of responding to new
technologies in reproduction and distribution of expression was present in sixteenth
century). In England, in 1476, William Caxton advanced the method of using the print-
ing press for large-scale publishing of books. Id. at 6. In 1534, the Crown, fearing
advancement of radical religious and political philosophies, issued a royal decree re-
quiring individuals to obtain a license and official censor approval before publishing.
Id. This decree led to a publishing monopoly by the Stationer's Company, a group that
upheld the Crown's agenda. Id. The monopoly ended in 1694 and, in 1710, Parlia-
ment passed the first copyright act, the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19, which inevitably
reduced the publishers' power and instead implemented protection based on the au-
thors' rights. Id.
43. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 12-13 (stating that new information age re-
quires consideration of changes and adaptations to present copyright law); GROVES,
supra note 28, at 1 (explaining that rise of computer age has already caused changes in
copyright law). The advent of the personal computer resulted in the creation of law
regarding copyright protection of software and computer databases. Id.; see, e.g., Com-
puter Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
literal elements of computer programs are protectable by copyright law).
44. Chinni, supra note 33, at 149.
45. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 610.
46. Id.
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the right of paternity,47 the right of integrity,48 and the disclo-
sure49 right.5° The personal nature of these rights may prevent a
work from completely entering the public domain because a cre-
ator may forbid individuals from using the work in a manner
inconsistent with the creator's moral philosophy.-'
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works52 ("Berne Convention"), provides for moral rights
in Article 6bis 5 and requires all signatories to protect moral
rights in their domestic laws.54 The United States, a member of
the Berne Convention, does not explicitly recognize moral
rights.55 U.S. lawmakers have, however, addressed moral rights
47. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 145 (explaining right of paternity as right to be
named as author of work).
48. See Rosen, supra note 32, at 161 (describing right of integrity as artists' right to
prevent distortion or alteration of their creations).
49. SeeJOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 611 (defining right of disclosure as right to
specify conditions of presentation of work to public).
50. Rosen, supra note 32, at 158-63.
51. Chinni, supra note 33, at 156.
52. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised
at Paris 1971, Cmnd 5002, at 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. SeeJoYcE ET AL., supra
note 11, at 984 (discussing Berne Convention). The Berne Convention is a multilateral
copyright convention that was first established in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland. Id. The
Paris Act of 1971 revised the current treaty. Id. at 984-85.
53. Berne Convention, supra note 52, art. 6bis, at 6-7. Article 6bis provides:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the trans-
fer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or any other modifi-
cation of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding para-
graph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions
authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of ratifica-
tion of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after
the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding para-
graph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease
to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.
Id.
54. JoYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 611.
55. Id.; see White Paper, supra note 2, at 145-46 (explaining that when United States
joined Berne Convention, Congress determined that existing remedies under statutory
and common law provided defacto moral rights protection).
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in U.S. federal and state legislation. 56
B. U.S. Copyright Law
The U.S. Constitution states that Congress, in order to pro-
mote the advancement of intellectual creations, has the power to
provide authors5 7 with exclusive rights over their works.5" The
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this Constitutional provi-
sion as requiring a grant of valuable rights to authors so that
authors may be induced to create and share their works with the
public.59 Congress has attempted to apply the Constitutional re-
quirements by passing federal copyright acts in 1790,60 1909,61
and 1976.62
1. Copyright Doctrine
The Copyright Act of 197663 ("Act of 1976") is the latest ma-
jor Congressional effort to codify copyright law in the United
States.' In order to foster an incentive to create65 intellectual
property, the Act of 1976 gives copyright owners certain com-
56. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 146 (explaining that legislators have provided
for protection of moral rights in both federal and state laws).
57. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (maintaining that authors
are "originators" who may produce "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative in-
tellectual or aesthetic labor.").
58. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Article I, section 8, clause 8 states that Congress
shall have the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." Id.
59. See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939) (stating
that copyright is "intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors ...
to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary works of lasting benefit
to the world.").
60. SeeJoYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 10 (stating that first U.S. copyright act, passed
in 1790, gave authors right to capitalize on maps, charts, and books).
61. See id. (explaining that after revisions in 1831 and 1870 to act of 1790, Copy-
right Act of 1909 ("1909 Act") expanded scope of copyright protection in United States
by further defining subject matter protected, rights and remedies).
62. See id. at 11 (stating that in 1955, Congress, finding provisions of 1909 Act to be
unworkable, authorized copyright law revision project which finally resulted in Copy-
right Act of 1976).
63. Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1997) [hereinafter
Act of 1976].
64. SeeJOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 12-13 (explaining effect of Act of 1976).
65. See Carmichael, supra note 3, at 765 (stating that Congress granted limited
monopoly rights to authors in order to give future authors incentive to produce new
works); see also Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1555 (maintaining that Act of 1976 gives copy-
right holders control over almost all activities of conceivable commercial value).
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mercially valuable rights over their works.6 6 In addition, individ-
uals who violate a copyright owner's statutorily granted rights are
liable for copyright infringement.
67
Congress granted copyright owners the exclusive rights to
reproduce,6a prepare a derivative work of,69 distribute,70 per-
form,71 display,72 and in the case of sound recordings, perform
by means of a digital transmission, 7 their copyrighted mate-
rial.74 Individuals infringe a copyright if they perform or author-
ize another to perform any of the above activities without the
copyright holder's consent.75 In order to establish copyright in-
fringement, a plaintiff must prove ownership of a copyright in
the work at issue76 and the defendant's copying of that protected
expression.77 A copyright owner may establish proof of owner-
66. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1997). A copyright owner has the exclusive right:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies... ; (2) to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies ... of the
copyrighted work to the public... ; (4) ... to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; (5) . . to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of
sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.
Id.
67. 17 U.S.C. 501(a) (1997). See White Paper, supra note 2, at 100 (explaining indi-
vidual's liability arising from infringement of copyright owner's exclusive rights).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1997).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1997).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1997). The distribution right encompasses publication of
copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997) (defining "publication" as "distribution
of copies ... of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending."). The Act of 1976 further states, "[a] public performance or display
of a work does not of itself constitute publication." Id.; see White Paper, supra note 2, at
215 (stating that courts' interpretations of publication offer guidance as to what consti-
tutes distribution to public).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1997).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1997).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (1997). The provision granting an exclusive right to copy-
right holders to publicly perform sound recordings by means of a digital audio trans-
mission is an outgrowth of the Digital Performance Right and Sound Recordings Act of
1995 ("Sound Recordings Act"). See H.R. 1506, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (illustrat-
ing text of bill introduced April 7, 1995).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (1997).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1997).
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1997) (stating that copyright ownership gives individu-
als right to exploit copyrighted work, sue others for infringement, and license acquired
rights in whole or in part).
77. Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1366-67; Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686; Playboy, 839 F.
Supp. at 1556; see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COFPGHT § 13.01
(1996) (explaining plaintiff's burden of proving ownership and copying in order to
establish infringement).
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ship by service upon the court of certificates of copyright regis-
tration.78 When there is a lack of direct evidence of copying in
infringement cases, 79 a plaintiff must circumstantially prove
copying by showing that a defendant had access to the copy-
righted work80 along with evidence of substantial similarity81 be-
tween the copyrighted expression and the allegedly infringing
material.82
2. Infringement Standards Applied to OSPs
In recent cases addressing OSP liability for copyright in-
fringement, district courts easily found ownership and copying
of the copyrighted works.83 The courts, however, labored more
on the question of the violation of the copyright owner's exclu-
sive rights and applied different standards of infringement to the
defendants in each case.8 4 The varying approaches of the courts
reflect the U.S. copyright law's different liability standards for
78. See, e.g., Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686 (finding that presentation of registration
certificates amounts to prima facie evidence of plaintiffs copyright ownership in video
game programs); Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556 (holding that copyright registration cer-
tificate constituted primafacie evidence of ownership). Owners of a copyright register
their claims by depositing an application, a fee, and copies of their work with the U.S.
Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1997). The Playboy court explained that the burden
shifts to the defendant after plaintiff submits prima facie evidence of ownership in the
form of such copyright registration. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
79. SeeJovct ET AL., supra note 11, at 692 (stating that direct evidence of infringe-
ment is almost always not available).
80. Compare Schwartz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 271 (S.D. Cal.
1945) (stating that access occurs when alleged infringer "saw the first person's work")
with Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (inferring
access through defendant's "opportunity to see" original work).
81. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 77, at § 13.03[A) (explaining substantial sim-
ilarity).
It is clear that slight or trivial similarities are not substantial and are therefore
non-infringing. But it is equally clear that two works may not be literally iden-
tical and yet, for purposes of copyright infringement, may be found substan-
tially similar. The problem, then, is one of line drawing. Somewhere between
the one extreme of no similarity and the other of complete and literal similar-
ity lies the line marking off the boundaries of "substantial similarity."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. JoycE ET AL., supra note 11, at 692-93.
83. See, e.g., Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1367 (showing simple conclusion of
ownership and copying of copyrighted material); Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686 (illustrating
court's finding of ownership and copying); Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556 (explaining
court's determination of ownership of copyright and copying of protected works).
84. Compare Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1381 (supporting plaintiff's theory of
contributory infringement, but rejecting claims of direct and vicarious infringement)
with Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 688 (stating that plaintiff established likelihood of success on
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direct, 5 contributory,86 and vicarious8 7 infringement.88
a. Direct Infringement
Individuals directly commit copyright infringement when
they violate any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
enumerated in section 106 of the Act of 1976.9 The court in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena9 ° relied on the standard of direct
copyright infringement l to hold the defendant OSP liable.9"
The defendant in Playboy operated a computer BBS.93 The
plaintiff maintained and the defendant admitted that the BBS
displayed and made 170 computerized images of Playboy Enter-
prises, Inc.'s ("Playboy") copyrighted photographs available for
users to download.94 The plaintiffs infringement claim was
based on BBS users downloading of copies of the photographs
to their personal computers without Playboy's authorization.95
merits for its claims of direct and contributory infringement) and Playboy, 839 F. Supp.
at 1559 (relying solely on direct infringement to hold defendant liable).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1997) (stating that individuals are directly liable for
copyright infringement when they violate exclusive rights of copyright owners).
86. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 13.
87. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963) (outlining that defendants may be liable for vicarious infringement if they are
able to control conduct of infringers and obtain direct financial benefit from infringing
activities).
88. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 115 (stating that U.S. copyright law allows
courts to find defendants directly, contributorily, or vicariously liable for copyright in-
fringement).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1997); see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 437 n.18 (1984) (distinguishing actions of direct infringer from those of
third party infringer).
90. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
91. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (explaining that direct infringer per-
sonally commits violation of one of exclusive statutory rights granted to copyright
holder). The court distinguished direct infringement from contributory and vicarious
standards of liability where third persons violate the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner. Id.
92. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
93. Id. at 1554.
94. Id. The defendant admitted that his customers downloaded each of the 170
images. Id. The defendant, however, contended that he never uploaded the images
onto the BBS. Id.
95. Id. The court in Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., held, "copying for
purposes of copyright law occurs when a computer program is transferred from a per-
manent storage device to a computer's RAM [random access memory]." 991 F.2d 511,
518 (9th Cir. 1993). A computer's RAM temporarily records data and loses it when a
user turns the computer off. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (discussing transient properties of RAM). In contrast to
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The court maintained that the defendant violated the plain-
tiff's exclusive right to distribute the works to the public.96 The
court held that it was enough that the defendant supplied a ser-
vice that stored infringing copies of the work9 7 and that the de-
fendant was still liable even though he did not make the copies
himself.98 The court also determined that the defendant in-
fringed on Playboy's right to display its work.99 The court
broadly construed the display right and stated that unauthorized
transmission of a work over a computer system is a violation of
the privilege to display one's work.100 Moreover, the court noted
that the display, which only BBS subscribers viewed, was suffi-
ciently public to warrant a holding of infringement.0 1
RAM, a computer's read-only memory ("ROM") permanently stores files without losing
them after the an individual turns the power off. A. BRUCE CARLSON & DAVID G. GISSER,
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 615 (2d ed. 1990). Download-
ing enables people to obtain files and initially store them in the computer's RAM or
transfer them for permanent storage in the computer's ROM. See generally, BARAN,
supra note 2, at 18 (explaining that downloading lets user store information on her
computer). Under the reasoning in Mai Systems, because subscribers transferred the
downloaded photographs in Playboy, in the least, to their RAM, they copied the photo-
graphs for purposes of the Act of 1976. 991 F.2d at 519. Moreover, the court in Reli-
gious Technology held that a subscriber made copies when he uploaded files and "fixed"
the files on BBS storage devices. 907 F. Supp. at 1368. The Act of 1976 requires that
copyrighted works be "fixed in any tangible mediurfi of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
Fixation occurs when the work is in a form in which it is "sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a pe-
riod of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Religious Technology court
held that uploaded files that remained on a bulletin board system for a maximum of
eleven days satisfied the fixation requirement. 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
96. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1997) (outlining exclusive
rights of copyright owner).
97. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
98. Id. The court went on to hold that a court may find copyright infringement
even though the defendant may have been unaware of the infringing activity. Id. at
1559. The court noted, "[i]ntent or knowledge is not an element of infringement, and
thus even an innocent infringer is liable for infringement." Id.
99. Id. at 1557; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1997) (listing rights exclusively held by copy-
right owner).
100. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556-57. The court stated that the display right covers
"the projection of an image on a screen or other surface by any method, the transmis-
sion of an image by electronic or other means, and the showing of an image on a
cathode ray tube, or similar viewing apparatus connected with any sort of information
storage and retrieval system." Id. at 1556 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 64 (1976)).
101. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1557. A display is public if it occurs "where a substan-
tial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances
1997] COPYRIGHT LAWS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 1387
In Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, °2 the plaintiff, a video
game manufacturer, sued the defendant, a BBS operator, for
copyright infingement of the plaintiffs video games. 10 3 The
plaintiff's video games were available, without the plaintiffs au-
thorization, on the defendant's BBS for users to download. 10 4
The court, in issuing a preliminary injunction'0 5 enjoining the
defendant from using the BBS for unauthorized copying of the
plaintiffs video games,"0 6 found that defendant's operation of
the BBS constituted prima facie direct infringement.10 7
In Religious Technology Center v. NetCom Online Communica-
tions Services, Inc.,"°8 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant,
NetCom Online Communications Services, Inc. ("NetCom"), an
Internet access provider,"0 9 should be liable for a BBS user's
copyright infringement." 0 Prior to commencement of suit, the
plaintiffs informed NetCom of the presence of the copyrighted
works on the BBS, but NetCom failed to remove any of the
materials."' Following NetCom's refusal to eliminate the in-
fringing works from the BBS, the plaintiffs sued NetCom on the
theory of direct liability.1 12
The court addressed whether NetCom should be directly li-
is gathered." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 77, at § 8.14[C] (1996). The court con-
cluded that the viewing audience of BBS users satisfied the above criteria. Playboy, 839
F. Supp. at 1557.
102. 857 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Cal. 1994).
103. Sega, 857 F. Supp at 681-83.
104. Id. at 683. The court stated that an unlimited number of customers could
have downloaded an uploaded game appearing on the bulletin board. Id.
105. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
106. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 690.
107. Id. at 686.
108. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
109. See id. at 1365 (stating that defendant's service provides BBS users with access
to Internet).
110. Id. In Religious Technology, the plaintiffs own copyrights in certain works of L.
Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology. Id. The plaintiffs com-
plained that a BBS subscriber posted, without authorization, the copyrighted materials
on the Internet. Id. at 1365-66. The plaintiffs not only sued the subscriber, but also
sued the Internet access provider because it supplied the subscriber with a connection
to the Internet and the means to post the copyrighted works. Id. at 1366.
111. Id. at 1366. When asked to halt any future infringement, NetCom main-
tained that they could not possibly prescreen bulletin board postings and refused to
remove from their service subscribers suspected of infringement. Id. NetCom stated,
however, that a technically reworked system may screen postings from specific persons.
Id. at 1368. The court learned that NetCom has suspended accounts of users who had
commercial software in their posted files. Id.
112. Id. at 1367.
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able for infringement because they operated a service which
temporarily stored uploaded copies of the plaintiffs copyrighted
works.113 Unlike the court in Playboy, the Religious Technology
court held that the defendant BBS operator did not directly in-
fringe on the plaintiffs' exclusive rights to publicly distribute or
display their copyrighted works.11 4 The court found that the de-
fendant, by operating a service which automatically made copies
of uploaded files, did not cause the works to be publicly distrib-
uted and displayed.115
b. Contributory Infringement
A contributory infringer aids a direct infringer by personally
inducing or causing the infringement or by supplying the mater-
ials required for the infringement to take place. 6 In both in-
stances, the defendant must have knowledge of the infringing
activity to be held liable. 7 The Sega court raised the issue of the
defendant's contributory infringement.1 1 8 The Sega court held
that the defendant's provision of the BBS amounted to contribu-
tory infringement even though the defendant did not know ex-
actly when subscribers downloaded the games from the BBS. 119
In Religious Technology, the court denied NetCom's motion
for summary judgment 12 and determined that the plaintiffs
presented a genuine issue of fact12' regarding the contributory
113. Id. at 1367-68. The court stated that NetCom "did not take any affirmative
action that directly resulted in copying plaintiffs' works other than by installing and
maintaining a system whereby software automatically forwards messages received from
subscribers ... and temporarily stores copies on its system." Id. at 1368.
114. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (stating "[t]he court is not entirely
convinced that mere possession of a digital copy on a BBS that is accessible to some
members of the public constitutes direct infringement by the BBS operator.").
115. Id. The court commented, "[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute,
there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party." Id. at 1370; see
White Paper, supra note 2, at 101 (addressing strict liability aspect of infringement).
Courts find infringement without referring to the intent of the infringer. Id.
116. See Carmichael, supra note 3, at 784 (explaining role of contributory in-
fringer); Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686 (discussing elements of contributory infringement).
117. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686.
118. Id. at 686-87.
119. Id.
120. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1366 (explaining that court decided to treat
NetCom's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment).
121. See id. (stating that court may grant summaryjudgment in favor of NetCom if
it finds no genuine issue as to any material fact); see also Fed. R Civ. P. 56(c) (enumerat-
ing summary judgment standard).
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infringement claim. 1 2 The court in Religious Technology found a
genuine dispute of fact regarding NetCom's knowledge of and
substantial participation in the infringing activity. 123 The Reli-
gious Technology court, however, pointed out that NetCom was
not contributorily liable for any infringement that occurred
before they received notice of the infringing activity from the
plaintiffs.1 24
When analyzing the question of knowledge of infringing ac-
tivity by an OSP for a finding of contributory infringement, U.S.
courts have required more than a suspicion of infringement.1 2 5
For example, in Sega, the court found that the OSP's encourage-
ment of use of the service for downloading copyrighted video
games constituted knowledge.1 26 In addition, in Religious Tech-
nology, the court determined that the OSP did not know of in-
fringement until after the plaintiff notified the OSP of the in-
fringing activity.127  In both cases, the defendants possessed
more than adequate information to reasonably conclude that in-
fringement did or would take place.1
28
c. Vicarious Liability
The Religious Technology court granted summary judgment
in favor of NetCom with respect to whether NetCom was vicari-
ously liable for the infringement.1 29 The court applied the stan-
dard of vicarious liability which states that a defendant must be
122. Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
123. Id. at 1374-75. The Religious Technology court stated that. because the plaintiffs
notified the defendant of the presence of infringing materials on the bulletin board,
NetCom arguably knew or should have known of infringing activity. Id. 4t 1374.
NetCom's failure to correct the situation after learning of possible infringement, indi-
cated substantial participation and a possible finding of contributory infringement. Id.
at 1375.
124. Id. at 1374. Prior to receiving notice of the infringing activity from the plain-
tiffs, NetCom was not aware of the infringement. Id.
125. See id. at 1374 (stating that defendants' lack of knowledge is reasonable where
they are unable to verify infringement claim); Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686-87 (citing de-
fendant's direction and encouragement of infringement as satisfying contributory in-
fringement requirement).
126. 857 F. Supp. at 687.
127. 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
128. See id. at 1366 (explaining that plaintiffs contacted defendants regarding in-
fringing works appearing on Internet); Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 687 (concluding that plain-
tiffs have shown "strong likelihood of success on the merits" regarding contributory
infringement claim).
129. Religious Technology, 907 F. Supp. at 1377.
19971 1389
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capable of controlling the conduct of the infringer and receive a
direct financial reward as a result of the infringement. 130  The
court found a genuine issue of fact with regard to whether
NetCom had the right and ability to control the subscriber's in-
fringing acts.' 3 ' The court did not find a genuine issue of fact,
however, regarding the claim that NetCom received direct finan-
cial benefit from the infringement. 32 The court reasoned that
NetCom's fixed subscriber fee is not a financial benefit that
stems from the infringing activity.' 33
C. U.K Copyright Law
U.K. copyright law, like U.S. copyright legislation,13 4 at-
tempts to encourage creation of intellectual works by granting
130. Id. at 1375. The court stated, "a defendant is [vicariously liable] for the ac-
tions of a primary infringer where the defendant (1) has the right and ability to control
the infringer's acts and (2) receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement."
Id. The court, in Shapiro, enumerating the vicarious liability standard, stated:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials, even in the ab-
sence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired, the
purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability
upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.
316 F.2d at 307; see NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 77, at § 12.04[(A] [1] (stating that
defendant does not need to know of infringing activity to be found vicariously liable).
131. Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1376. NetCom's subscriber agreement re-
quires that, in the event of an infringement, its subscribers be subject to remedial ac-
tion by the service. Id. at 1375. NetCom explicitly prohibits copyright infringement
and requires user indemnification for damage to third parties. Id. at 1376. NetCom,
however, argued that they were not able to screen the large number of postings. Id.
Conversely, the plaintiffs contended, and NetCom admitted, that if NetCom had modi-
fied their software, they would have had the ability to monitor incoming postings. Id.;
see id. at 1368 (discussing NetCom's admission regarding possibility of reprogramming
system to prescreen certain postings). The court found the plaintiffs' evidence persua-
sive and, accordingly, found a genuine issue of fact with respect to NetCom's control
over the subscribers. Id. at 1376.
132. Id. at 1377.
133. Id. The court found that NetCom charges a fixed fee to subscribers and re-
ceives no direct financial benefit from the infringing postings. Id. The court cited
arguments which analogized NetCom's situation to that of a landlord who is not liable
for infringement on his premises. Id. at 1376; see Kelly Tickle, Comment, The Vicarious
Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their
Bulletin Boards, 80 IowA L. REv. 391, 415 (1995) (stating that BBS operators are land-
lords who lease space on computer systems).
134. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 210, 219 (1954) (stating "[t]he economic philoso-
phy behind [U.S. copyright law] is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance the public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors.").
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individuals exclusive rights over their creative endeavors. l51 U.K.
copyright law of the eighteenth century gave authors the exclu-
sive right to print books.'3 6 With the passage of time, legislators
increased the scope of protection 137 and created laws to address
technological advances.'3 8 The latest major effort to confront
new technology came in 1988 with the promulgation of the
Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act ("1988 Act"). 3 9
1. The Restricted Acts
Like the U.S. legislation on copyrights, the 1988 Act has
provisions concerning the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner.1 40 The 1988 Act, unlike U.S. legislation, addresses stor-
age of copyrighted material on a computer.141 Under the provi-
sions of the 1988 Act, storage of a copyrighted work on a com-
puter amounts to copying.' 41 In addition, the 1988 Act defines a
135. See GROVES, supra note 28, at 1 (discussing importance of maintaining incen-
tive to create copyrightable works).
136. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 13; seeJOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 6 (discuss-
ing U.K copyright legislation in eighteenth century).
137. INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, at 13.
138. See GROVES, supra note 28, at 1 (acknowledging that advent of personal com-
puter has forced copyright law to address computer software and databases).
139. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48 (Eng.) in HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES FOURTH EDITION 337 (Butterworths 1991) [hereinafter 1988 Act]; see PETER STONE,
CoPRIGr LAw IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 (1990) (dis-
cussing history of British copyright legislation).
140. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 16(1)(a)-(e), at 355. Section 16(1)(a)-(e) state:
(1) The owner of the copyright in a work has ... the exclusive right to do the
following acts in the United Kingdom: (a) to copy the work; (b) to issue cop-
ies of the work to the public; (c) to perform, show, or play the work in public;
(d) to broadcast the work or include it in a cable program service; and (e) to
make an adaptation of the work or do any of the above in relation to an adap-
tation.
Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1997) (outlining exclusive rights of copyright owner in United
States under Act of 1976).
141. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 17(2), at 357; compare GROVES, supra note 28, at 55
(stating that 1988 Act addresses storage of work on computer) and INTERNET LAw, supra
note 4, at 16 (discussing added provision for computer copying in 1988 Act) with Mai
Systems, 991 F.2d at 518 (asserting common law conclusion that storage on computer's
RAM constitutes copying for purposes of Act of 1976).
142. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 17(2), at 357. The legislative history of the 1988
Act helps to clarify the treatment of computer programs. GROVES, supra note 28, at 55.
"[I]t will be made clear that the rights given to copyright owners over reproduction
extend to copying by fixing a work on [sic] any medium from which the work can in
principle be reproduced." 1986 White Paper on Intellectual Property and Innovation,
Cmnd 9712, 9.5. Accordingly, under the 1988 Act, "copying includes storing the work
in any medium by electronic means[, where] electronic [is defined as] actuated by
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Under U.K law, individuals commit copyright infringement
if they, without the copyright owner's consent, violate any of the
exclusive rights granted by the 1988 Act. 1 " Such acts constitute
primary infringement. 14- In addition, the 1988 Act categorizes
certain activities which encompass dealing with infringing copies
as secondary infringement. 146  Moreover, the U.K legislators
also included provisions for vicarious liability in the 1988 Act. 1
47
a. Primary Infringement
In the United Kingdom, individuals primarily infringe copy-
right when they, without the license of the copyright owner,
copy, 4 8 distribute, 4 9 perform, 150 broadcast,1 51 or prepare an ad-
aptation of 152 a copyrighted work or authorize another to per-
form those acts. 5 ' Like the U.S. District Courts in Playboy15 4 and
electric, magnetic, electro-magnetic, electro-chemical, or electro-mechanical energy."
INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, at 16.
143. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 17, at 357; GROVES, supra note 28, at 56. A provi-
sion defining incidental or temporary reproductions as copies impacts the question of
Internet copyright infringement. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 16. Following the
scheme of the 1988 Act, "an unauthorized copy made temporarily in RAM while acces-
sing a copyright[ed] work on the Internet would be an infringement." Id.
144. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 16(2), at 355.
145. INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, at 16.
146. 1988 Act, supra note 139, §§ 22-26, at 360-64; see GROVES, supra note 28, at 65
(defining secondary infringement under broad category of "dealing"); STONE, supra
note 139, at 48 (explaining secondary infringement).
147. See 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 16(2), at 355 (stating "[c]opyright in a work is
infringed by a person who without the license of the copyright owner.., authorizes
another to [engage in primary infringement].").
148. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 16(1)(a), at 355.
149. Id. § 16(1)(b), at 355.
150. Id. § 16(1)(c), at 355.
151. Id. § 16(1)(d), at 355.
152. Id. § 16(1)(e), at 355.
153. Id. § 16(2), at 355. Section 16(2) states, "[c]opyright in a work is infringed by
a person who without the license of the copyright owner does, or authorizes another to
do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright " Id. An individual who violates a re-
stricted act is a primary infringer. STONE, supra note 139, at 41. The concept of pri-
mary infringement is essentially identical to the U.S. standard of direct infringement.
See White Paper supra note 2, at 100 (defining infringer as one who without authorization
violates exclusive rights set out in Act of 1976). Like U.S. law, knowledge is not an
element of primary infringement. Compare GROwS, supra note 28, at 54 (stating that
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Sega,155 U.K. courts might find an OSP liable for primary in-
fringement. 56 In Playboy, a U.S. court found that the OSP vio-
lated the plaintiffs rights to publicly distribute and display the
copyrighted material.1 57 Some U.K. legal practitioners specu-
lated that a U.K. court, under the 1988 Act, might find an OSP
directly liable for issuing unauthorized copies of the work to the
public and showing or playing the work in public. 158 These com-
mentators contemplated that a U.K. court might be more apt to
find direct infringement because the 1988 Act stipulates that
copying includes storing a work in any medium by electronic
means 5 9 and materials are generally stored on an Internet host's
computer before downloading occurs. 6°
b. Secondary Infringement
The acts of secondary infringement include importation of
infringing copies, 16  possessing or dealing with an infringing
copy,162 providing the means for making infringing copies,
a63
permitting the use of premises for infringing performance,
a64
and providing the apparatus for infringing performance.1 65 The
knowledge is not element of infringement) with White Paper supra note 2, at 101 (stating
that court may find infringement without considering state of mind of infringer).
154. 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
155. 857 F. Supp. at 686.
156. See INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 19 (speculating about policies of U.K.
courts).
157. 839 F. Supp. at 1556; see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing holding in Playboy case).
158. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 19.
159. See 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 17(2), at 357 (outlining provision for storing
work by electronic means).
160. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 19. Because of the absence of case law on
Internet copyright issues, legal scholars may only predict the policy approaches of U.K.
courts. Id.
161. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 22, at 360.
162. Id. § 23, at 361. The 1988 Act includes possession in the course of business
under "possessing or dealing with an infringing copy." Id. § 23(a), at 361. The 1988
Act defines business as any trade or profession. Id. § 178, at 473; see GROVES, supra note
28, at 66 (discussing possessing or dealing in 1988 Act).
163. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 24, at 362. Individuals may be liable for "provid-
ing the means for infringement" if they "let for hire . . . an article . . . designed or
adapted for making copies of [a] work." Id. § 24(1) (d), at 362. Under that same cate-
gory, a person may also be liable for unauthorized transmission of a work by means of a
telecommunication system, such as telephone lines. Id. § 24(2), at 362; see GROVES,
supra note 28, at 67-68 (defining in detail provisions of Section 24 of 1988 Act).
164. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 25, at 363.
165. Id. § 26, at 363-64.
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1988 Act requires that the secondary infringer know of the in-
fringing activity. 166 The U.K. courts' interpretation of the knowl-
edge requirement parallels that of the U.S. courts, 16 7 in that the
U.K. courts maintain that knowledge includes a reasonable be-
lief that the infringing activity has taken or will take place.' 68 Ac-
cordingly, the court in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. HI-TEC Sports, plc. held
that knowledge is present when a reasonable man's interpreta-




The House of Lords construed the concept of vicarious in-
fringement in CBS Songs v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics1 70 to ap-
166. See 1988 Act, supra note 139, §§ 22-26, at 360-64 (illustrating knowledge re-
quirement for categories of secondary infringement). Under the Copyright Act of 1956
("1956 Act"), the copyright owner needed to show that the secondary infringer "knew
he was dealing with infringing copies... ." GROVES, supra note 28, at 65; see Copyright
Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 5 (Eng.) [hereinafter 1956 Act] (outlining knowledge
requirement). The 1988 Act reduced the copyright owner's burden of proving knowl-
edge of infringing activity. GRoVES, supra note 28, at 65. Under the 1988 Act, the copy-
right owner need only prove that the suspected infringer "knows or has reason to be-
lieve that infringement has taken, or would take, place." Id.
In L.A. Gear, Inc. v. HI-TEC Sports, plc., the court distinguished the knowledge re-
quirements under the 1956 and 1988 Acts by addressing the addition of the words "rea-
son to believe" in the 1988 Act. [1992] F.S.R. 121, 129 (CA.) (Eng.). The court stated
that the 1956 Act attributed knowledge to a defendant when the defendant was aware
of facts that led him to conclude that "it would be obvious that something was an in-
fringing copy...." Id. In contrast, the court found that "reason to believe," under the
1988 Act, "involve[s] the concept of knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man
would arrive at the relevant belief." Id. The court went on to hold, "[flacts from which
a reasonable man might suspect the relevant conclusion cannot be enough." Id.; see
Hutchison Personal Communications Ltd. v. Hook Advertising Ltd., [1995] F.S.R. 365,
379 (Ch.) (Eng.) (holding that merely putting defendants on notice of disputed facts
was not sufficient to give defendant's reason to believe that they were dealing with in-
fringing copies); see also Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1374-75 (discussing that, in
United States, notice of possible infringing activity given to defendants was enough to
hold defendants to knowledge of infringement).
167. Compare Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that courts may find defendants contribu-
torily liable if they have reason to know that infringing activity is taking place) with L.A.
Gear [1992] F.S.R. at 129 (implementing standard that copyright owner must prove that
infringer "knows or has reason to believe that infringement has taken, or would take
place").
168. GROVES, supra note 28, at 65.
169. See L.A. Gear, [1992] F.S.R. at 129 (stating "[flacts from which a reasonable
man might suspect the relevant conclusion cannot be enough.").
170. [19881 2 W.L.R. 1191, [1988] 2 All E.R. 484 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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ply to those individuals who intentionally authorize a third per-
son to commit infringement.171 In addition, the House of Lords
stated that in order to be subject to vicarious liability, an individ-
ual granting the authority must be in a position to control the
grantee's actions.
1 7 2
D. EC Copyright Law
Legal scholars contend that the European Community, in
order to advance a single market economy, must concern itself
with harmonization of copyright law.17  The objectives of the
European Community are furthered when Member States pro-
mulgate national copyright laws that are consistent with a com-
mon market. 174 As such, the European Community encourages
little variance of copyright legislation between individual Mem-
ber States.1 75
1. The Goal of a Common Market
The European Community presently consists of fifteen
Member States. 176 Each Member State has national laws relating
to copyright. 177 EC law, however, affects the laws of the Member
States and may supersede national legislation. 178 In the event of
171. Id. at 1203, [1988] 2 All E.R. at 493. The court defined authorizing as "pur-
port[ing] to grant a third person the right to do the relevant act, whether the intention
is that the grantee should do the act on his own account or on account of the grantor
. ... " Id. Prior to the House of Lords decision in CBS Songs, some U.K courts viewed
authorization more broadly. STONE, supra note 139, at 56. In Performing Right Society,
Ltd. v. Ciyl Theatrical Syndicate, Ltd., the court stated that authorization may be inferred
"from acts which fall short of being direct or positive;.., indifference, exhibited by acts
of commission or omission, may reach a degree from which authorization or permis-
sion may be inferred." [1924] 1 K.B. 1, 9 (CA) (Eng.); see STONE, supra note 139, at 56
(discussing different interpretations of meaning of authorizing).
172. CBS Songs, [1988] 2 W.L.R. at 1203, [1988] 2 All E.R. at 493.
173. Herman Cohen Jehoram & Ben Smulders, The Law of the European Community
and Copyright, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE EC-i, EC-67 (Melville B.
Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller eds., 1996).
174. Thomas C. Vinje, Harmonising Intellectual Property Laws in the European Union:
Past, Present and Future, [1995] 8 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 361, 377.
175. Id. at 361.
176. Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-7. The six original members of
the European Community were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. Id. They were later joined by Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom,
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, and Austria joined at later dates. Id. at EC-7-
8.
177. Id. at EC-7.
178. Id. In certain cases, courts must look to EC law before determining the actual
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certain conflicts, 179 the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity18 ("EC Treaty") and laws arising from its provisions will
prevail over national legislation. 181
Article 2 of EC Treaty sets out the overall aim of the Euro-
pean Community as the achievement of a common market.
1 82
Subsequent provisions of the EC Treaty outline specific man-
dates designed to insure implementation of the common mar-
ket. 83 Article 3(h) requires that Member State laws aid in the
maintenance of the common market.1 8 4 In addition, Articles 30
through 36 prohibit restrictions on imports of Member State
goods in order to insure free movement of goods throughout
the European Community.1 85
effect of Member State legislation. Id. EC initiatives in the field of copyright impact
the development of national copyright laws on many points. Id.
179. See id. at EC-16 (explaining that EC law is controlling in event of conflict with
national intellectual property laws).
180. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 537 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TR.ATIES ESTABLISHING THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNIrIES (EC Off' Pub. Off. 1987).
181. SeeJehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-16. EC law is "supranational,"
which means that it is binding on Member States and courts must apply EC law directly
to claims in national forums. Id.; see Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425,
443-44 (confirming direct binding effect of Community law).
182. EC Treaty, supra note 180, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies
of activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Com-
munity a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sus-
tainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high de-
gree of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social pro-
tection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic
and social cohesion and solidarity among member-States.
Id.
183. Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-17.
184. EC Treaty, supra note 180, art. 3(h), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589. Article 3(h)
calls for "the approximation of laws of member-States to the extent required for the
functioning of a common market." Id. art. 3(h), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589; seeJehoram
& Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-18 (discussing provisions in EC Treaty which aid in
development of common market).
185. EC Treaty, supra note 180, arts. 30-36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602-05; see
Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-17 (discussing Articles of EC Treaty which
address prohibitions on imports). The provisions of Articles 30 through 36 follow from
Article 8's specific objectives of "eliminat[ing], as between member-States, customs du-
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The European Court of Justice 18 6 ("ECJ") has held that the
provisions and objectives set forth in the EC Treaty are applica-
ble to copyright.1 87 The ECJ incorporated intellectual property
into Article 36188 of the EC Treaty." 9 As a result of this incorpo-
ration, in order to insure a common market, the Council of Min-
isters9 ° ("Council") may institute legislation, including direc-
tives, 91 that harmonize copyright law among Member States.1 9 2
ties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and all other meas-
ures having equivalent effect," and of providing for a market "characterized by the abo-
lition, as between member-States, of obstacles to the freedom of movement for persons,
services, and capital." EC Treaty, supra note 180, art. 3(a),(c) [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588;
seeJehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-17 (explaining subsequent Articles of EC
Treaty implementing broad aims of Article 3).
186. See EC Treaty, supra note 180, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684 (outlining
role of ECJ). Article 164 states, "It] he Court ofJustice shall ensure that in the interpre-
tation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." Id.; see also Jehoram &
Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-14 (stating that ECJ, located in Luxembourg, deter-
mines proper application of Community law).
187. Coditel v. S.A. Cine Vog Films, Case 62/79, [1980] E.C.R. 881, 894.
188. EC Treaty, supra note 180, art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.LR. at 605. Article 36 reads,
"the provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on the grounds of ... the protection of
industrial and commercial property." Id.
189. Coditel, [1980] E.C.R. at 894; seeJehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-
20 (describing that in Coditel, ECJ, in paraphrase of Article 36, replaced term "industrial
and commercial property" with "intellectual property"). In Membran/K-Tel, the court
enunciated the EC Treaty's applicability to copyright by stating, "there is no reason,
according to the Court of Justice, to make a distinction between copyright and other
industrial and commercial property rights." Musik-Veritrieb Membran GmbH and K-tel
International v. GEMAJoined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 630, 634, at
4.
190. See Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-1I (explaining Council of
Ministers). The EC Council or Council of Ministers is comprised of representatives
from the Member States and adopts most of the legislation for the European Commu-
nity. Id.
191. See id. at EC-12 (stating that directive is piece of legislation requiring Member
States to tailor their national laws to implement directive's provisions in order to create
uniformity of law among Member States). Examples of directives in the field of copy-
right include, the Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs ("Software
Directive"), the Directive on the Rental Right, the Lending Right, and on Certain
Rights Related to Copyright ("Rental Rights Directive"), the Directive on the Coordina-
tion of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applica-
ble to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission ("Satellite Broadcasting Direc-
tive"), and the Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases ("Database Directive").
See Council Directive No. 91/250/EEC, O.J. L 122/42 (1991) [hereinafter Software Di-
rective] (providing copyright protection for computer programs); Council Directive
No. 92/100/EEC, O.J. L 346/61 (1992) [hereinafter Rental Rights Directive] (laying
out copyright holder's exclusive right to rent or lend protected material); Council Di-
rective No. 93/83/EEC, O.J. L 248/15 (1993) [hereinafter Satellite Broadcasting Direc-
tive] (outlining guidelines for rights in satellite broadcasts); Council Directive No. 96/
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2. Harmonization of Copyright Law
Legal scholars have argued that differences among Member
States regarding the scope and modes of protection generated
by copyright laws tend to thwart the advancement of the EC
common market objective.1 93 Varying levels of copyright protec-
tion from Member State to Member State cause uncertainties in
trade and business transactions,19 4 resulting in a depressed mar-
ket for intellectual property.' 95 In contrast, consistent copyright
legislation among Member States fosters a strong business cli-
mate and encourages trade.' 96 As a result, the European Com-
munity has encouraged community-wide harmonization of copy-
right laws. 197 Recent harmonization has occurred as a result of
the emergence of new technologies and is evidenced by the
Software,198 Rental Rights, 199 Satellite Broadcasting,200 and
Database20' directives.202
a. Software Directive
The Software Directive provides protection for computer
9/EC, O.J. L 77/20 (1996) [hereinafter Database Directive] (detailing rights acquired
by ownership of copyright in database).
192. Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-20.
193. Id. at EC-67.
194. Benjamin R. Kuhn, Note, A Dilemma in Cyberspace and Beyond: Copyright Law for
Intellectual Property Distributed over the Information Superhighways of Today and Tomorrow, 10
TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. LJ. 171, 202 (1996).
195. Id.
196. Vinje, supra note 174, at 377.
197. Kuhn, supra note 194, at 202; Vinje, supra note 174, at 361. The drafters of
the EC Treaty, anticipating a need for consistent legislation between the Member
States, included a specific provision ordering the Council to provide for uniform laws
when differences are hindering the overall aims of the European Community. EC
Treaty, supra note 180, art. 100, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633; seeJehoram & Smulders,
supra note 173, at EC-67 (discussing reasoning behind Article 100 of EC Treaty).
198. Software Directive, supra note 191, O.J. L 122/42 (1991).
199. Rental Rights Directive, supra note 191, OJ.'L 346/61 (1992).
200. Satellite Broadcasting Directive, supra note 191, O.J. L 248/15 (1993).
201. Database Directive, supra note 191, O.J. L 77/20 (1996); see BAAN, supra note
2, at 28 (discussing on-line databases). "On-line databases are simply collections of vari-
ous types of data (including text, but by no means limited to text). These databases
reside in computers with on-line connectivity, either through a direct-dial connection, a
commercial on-line service, or the Internet." Id. Subject matter included in databases
includes periodicals, legal and medical information, airline schedules, and financial
reports. Id. at 28-29.
202. See Kuhn, supra note 194, at 202 (stating that technological advancements
have created need for copyright protection on international level).
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programs by enumerating a series of restricted acts that an indi-
vidual may not perform without authorization by a copyright
owner.10 3 In addition, the Software Directive requires enforce-
ment of the rights secured by a copyright holder. 04 One legal
expert contends that the Software Directive is arguably one of
the more important accomplishments of EC intellectual prop-
erty legislation 5 because it illustrates the intent of the Euro-
pean Community to increase intellectual property protection20 6
and to develop international standards of copyright law.
217
b. Rental Rights Directive
Under Article 2 of the Rental Rights Directive,0 8 the exclu-
sive right to rent 2 9 or lend 210 copyrighted material belongs to an
203. Software Directive, supra note 191, art. 4, O.J. L 122/42, at 44 (1991). Re-
stricted acts under Article 4 of the Software Directive are those acts which the copyright
holder has the "right to do or authorize." Id. Article 4(a) labels "the permanent or
temporary reproduction of a computer program" as a restricted act and states that
when "loading, displaying, running, transmission or storage of the computer program
necessitate such reproduction, such acts shall be subject to authorization by the
rightholder." Id. Further restricted acts under Article 4(b) and (c) include "transla-
tion, adaptation, arrangement[,] ... any other alteration of a computer program, and
the reproduction results thereof [and] . . . any form of distribution to the public, in-
cluding the rental, of the original computer program or of copies thereof." Id. The
Council adopted the Software Directive on May 14, 1991 and gave Member States until
January 1, 1993 to comply with the Software Directive's terms. Id. arts. 10-11, O.J. L
122/42, at 46 (1991);Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-71. Only the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and Italy were able to meet the January 1, 1993 deadline. Vinje,
supra note 174, at 364. Since that time, however, all Member States have finalized legis-
lation consistent with the Software Directive. Id.
204. Vinje, supra note 174, at 364. Article 7 of the Software Directive calls for
appropriate remedies for "putting into circulation a copy of a computer program [and]
possess[ing] for commercial purposes .. . a copy of a computer program." Software
Directive, supra note 191, art. 7, O.J. L 122/42, at 45 (1991). In both cases, the in-
fringer must "know, or have reason to believe, that it is an infringing copy." Id.
205. See Vinje, supra note 174, at 361-63 (stating that Software Directive is critical
piece of intellectual property legislation in European Community).
206. Id. at 363.
207. Kuhn, supra note 194, at 203.
208. Rental Rights Directive, supra note 191, O.J. L 346/61 (1992). The Council
adopted the Rental Rights Directive on November 19, 1992, and the Member State
implementation deadline was July 1, 1994. Id. arts. 15(1), 16, O.J. L 346/61, at 66
(1992); Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-74. Six Member States, Belgium,
Greece, France, Italy, Austria, and Sweden, have set forth legislation in accordance with
the aims of the Directive. Vinje, supra note 174, at 370.
209. See Rental Rights Directive, supra note 191, art. 1, O.J. L 346/61, at 63 (1992)
(defining rental as "making available for use, for a limited period of time and for direct
or indirect economic or commercial advantage.").
210. See id. art. 1, O.J. L 346/61, at 63 (1992) (defining lending as "making avail-
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author, performer, phonogram producer, or film producer.
211
The Rental Rights Directive, in order to insure the effectiveness
of the rental and lending rights, requires Member States to pro-
vide exclusive rights of fixation, reproduction, communication
to the public, and distribution of copyrighted works.212
c. Satellite Broadcasting Directive
The Council offered the Satellite Broadcasting Directive213
to allow free movement of television programming throughout
the European Community.214 The Satellite Broadcasting Direc-
tive requires that broadcasters acquire their rights in a transmis-
sion from the Member State where the broadcaster introduces
the satellite signals.215 This requirement eliminates the confu-
able for use, for a limited period of time and not for direct or indirect economic or
commercial advantage, when it is made through establishments which are accessible to
the public.").
211. Id. art. 2, Oj. L 346/61, at 63 (1992). Article 2(1) states:
The exclusive right to authorize or prohibit rental and lending shall belong to
the author in respect of the original and copies of his work, to the performer
in respect of fixations of his performance, to the phonogram producer in re-
spect of his phonograms, and to the producer of the first fixation of a film in
respect of the original and copies of his film. For the purposes of this Direc-
tive, the term film shall designate a cinematographic or audiovisual work or
moving images, whether or not accompanied by sound.
Id.
212. Id. arts. 6-9, O.J. L 346/61, at 64 (1992); see Vinje, supra note 174, at 370
(stating effective rental and lending rights are contingent on harmonization of exclu-
sive rights of fixation, reproduction, public broadcast, and distribution for performers,
producers, and broadcasters among Member States).
213. Satellite Broadcasting Directive, supra note 191, OJ. L 248/15 (1993). The
Council adopted the Satellite Broadcasting Directive on September 27, 1993 with an
implementation date ofJanuary 1, 1995. Id. arts. 14(1), 15, Oj. L 248/15, at 21 (1993);
Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-77. As of 1995, none of the Member States
have finalized conforming legislation. Vinje, supra note 174, at 370.
214. Kuhn, supra note 194, at 206.
215. Satellite Broadcasting Directive, supra note 191, art. 1(2), Oj. L 248/15, at 19
(1993). Article 1(2)(a) and (b) state:
(a) For the purpose of this Directive, communication to the public by satellite
means the act of introducing, under the control and responsibility of the
broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals intended for re-
ception by the public .... (b) The act of communication to the public occurs
solely in the Member State where, under the control and responsibility of the
broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals are introduced
Id.; see Kuhn, supra note 194, at 206 (explaining point of insertion theory); Vinje, supra
note 174, at 370 (stating that broadcasters obtain rights only in Member State where
signal originates).
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sion created by the application of various national laws to one
broadcast.216 Under the Satellite Broadcasting Directive, broad-
casters will no longer have to negotiate for copyright royalties in
every Member State receiving the broadcast." 7
d. Database Directive
The Database Directive 218 provides the owner of a database
with the exclusive rights of reproduction, translation, adapta-
tion, distribution, and communication to the public of the
database.2 1 9 The Database Directive conditions the above rights
on the originality220 of the database, which authors satisfy if the
selection and arrangement of the contents reflects their intellec-
tual creations.22 In addition, the Database Directive also offers
a sui generis right222 prohibiting unauthorized extraction for
216. See Satellite Broadcasting Directive, supra note 191, Recital 14, OJ. L 248/15,
at 16 (1993) (stating that definition detailing where act of communication takes place
"is necessary to avoid the cumulative application of several national laws to one single
act of broadcasting.").
217. Vinje, supra note 174, at 370.
218. Database Directive, supra note 191, 0.J. L 77/20 (1996). The Council
adopted the Database Directive on March 11, 1996 with a deadline for Member State
implementation of January 1, 1998. Id. arts. 16(1), 17, O.J. L 77/20, at 27-28 (1996).
219. Id. art. 5, 0J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996). Article 5 states:
[Tihe author of a database shall have the exclusive right to carry out or au-
thorize: (a) temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any
form, in whole or in part; (b) translation, adaptation, arrangement and any
other alteration; (c) any form of distribution to the public of the database or
of copies thereof... (d) any communication, display or performance to the
public ....
Id.
220. SeeJoYcE ET AL., supra note 11, at 27 (explaining that originality requires that
copyrighted material be author's own work, not copied from another work).
221. Database Directive, supra note 191, art. 3, OJ. L 77/20, at 25 (1996); seeVinje,
supra note 174, at 366 (explaining selection and arrangement standard of originality).
The European Commission, by requiring selection and arrangement, has adopted a
similar approach to the U.S. Supreme Court's determination in Feist. Id.; see Feist Pub-
lications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991) (holding that
Court must look to author's selection and arrangement of material in compilation of
data when measuring originality).
222. See Jehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-86-88 (explaining sui generis
right as protecting not results of originality or creativity, but author's investment of
time, effort, and financial resources in creating database); see also Vinje, supra note 174,
at 366 (explaining sui generis protection). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Feist, rejected
the equivalent of the sui generis right, "sweat of the brow" protection. Feist, 499 U.S. at
354. The court stated, "[t]o accord copyright protection on [the] basis [of sweat of the
brow] alone distorts basic copyright principles in that it creates a monopoly in public
domain materials without the necessary justification of protecting and encouraging the
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commercial purposes of the contents of the database, which is
available regardless of the originality of the database. 223
II. DETERMINING SCOPE OF OSP LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
Governments around the world face the challenge of estab-
lishing the legislative groundwork for international intellectual
property protection in the new information society.22" The Task
Force, in the White Paper, maintains that the use of interactive
digital information networks is expanding2 25 and that U.S. legis-
lators must define the scope of copyright protection of works in
digital form. 6 U.K legal scholars also maintain that legislators
much reach conclusions regarding copyright law in the face of
Internet technology.2 27 Similarly, legal experts in the European
Community stress the importance of ascertaining the boundaries
of protection in the digital age. 28
A. Reconciling the Scope of Exclusive Rights with the Internet
Representatives at the December 1996 meeting of the WIPO
attempted to determine the scope of exclusive rights for the digi-
tal environment.229 The signatories, consistent with theories
that the European Community and the Task Force espoused,23 0
creation of 'writings' by 'authors.'" Id. (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 77, at
§ 3.04).
223. Database Directive, supra note 191, art. 7, O.J. L 77/20, at 25-26 (1996). Arti-
cle 7(1) states:
Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which
shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial in-
vestment in either obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to
prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part,
evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.
Id. art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996).
224. Wite Paper, supra note 2, at 148.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 148.
227. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 13.
228. Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions: Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet, COM (96) 487 Final at 4-
5 (Oct. 1996) [hereinafter Internet Communication].
229. Lewis, supra note 20, at Al.
230. See Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 8 (recom-
mending that legislators apply existing copyright concepts to digital technology); White
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applied traditional copyright concepts to new technologies."'
Though WIPO drafters favored expansion of conventional copy-
right principles to conform with computerized reproduction
and dissemination, some legal scholars maintain that legislators
should develop new exclusive rights to address Internet commu-
nications. 32
1. U.S. Proposals: White Paper and Commentary
The Task Force proposed that Congress amend the exclu-
sive right to distribute copyrighted works to the public233 to in-
clude a provision that recognizes that copyright owners also have
the exclusive right to distribute copies of their works to the pub-
lic by transmissions over high-speed communications systems. 3 4
In addition, the Task Force defined transmission to apply to in-
dividuals using a device or process to distribute reproductions. 235
The Task Force's definition encompasses reproductions which
are fixed after a transmission. 23 6  The Task Force maintained
that the proposal does not create a new right, but instead, in
response to technological advancements, recognizes that the dis-
tribution right addresses transmissions.237
In contrast, one legal commentator adopted the view that
the traditional idea of distribution is obsolete in the world of
digital dissemination.238 This individual set forth the concept of
Paper, supra note 2, at 212 (stating that legislators need only amend Act of 1976 to deal
with technological advances).
231. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 20, pmbl. (stating need to "clarify the
interpretation of existing rules in order to provide adequate solutions to questions
raised by new . . . technological developments.").
232. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 387 (arguing that traditional distribution
right is not adequate to address online technology); see also Simon Olswang, Accessright:
An Evolutionary Path for Copyright into the Digital Era?, [1995] 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
215, 217 (advocating exclusive right to control access to works online).
233. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)(1997).
234. White Paper, supra note 2, at 213. The proposed law would state that a copy-
right owner has the exclusive right "to distribute copies.., of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, by rental, lease, or lending, or by
transmission." Id. at app. 2 (emphasis in original). The Task Force also decided that
Congress should amend the definition of publication to recognize that individuals may
publish their works through distribution to the public by transmission. Id. at 219.
235. Id. at'217 n.543. "[T]o transmit a reproduction is to distribute it by any de-
vice or process whereby a copy.., of the work is fixed beyond the place from which it
was sent." Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 213-14.
238. Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 387.
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defining distribution in terms of providing access to informa-
tion.2 39  The commentator determined that if lawmakers re-
placed the distribution right with a right to restrict access, they
would upset the balance of power between the public and prov-
iders of information. 240 The author postulated that, under an
access defined regime, artists and OSPs would be able to exer-
cise more control over dissemination of works.2 4 1 The writer il-
lustrated this fact by explaining that, with an access right, an
OSP would have the power to restrict access to online informa-
tion, but individuals, under the present distribution system, are
unable to restrict access to printed books once consumers have
the physical copies in their possession.242
2. EC Proposals: Legislation Based on Existing Copyright
Principles
The European Commission 243 ("Commission") fosters the
view that the development of the Information Society.. in the
European Community is contingent on the existence of a Single
Market for new products and services. 45 The Commission be-
lieves that the European Community must provide for consistent
239. Id.; see Olswang, supra note 232, at 217 (advocating digital age system which
grants creators' right to control access to their works). One legal scholar from the
United Kingdom stated that the present copyright concepts are becoming "arcane and
artificial." Id. at 215. This legal commentator stated that a regime premised on copy-
right owners' rights to control access would require that accused infringers prove that
they knew that the copyright owner authorized access to a downloaded copy. Id. at 217.
Therefore, the right of access caters to the digital era by taking the burden of proving
knowledge away from the copyright holder and placing it on the possessor of the in-
fringing copy. Id. at 218.
240. Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 389.
241. Id. at 388-89.
242. Id. at 389.
243. SeeJehoram & Smulders, supra note 173, at EC-13 (explaining role of Euro-
pean Commission). The Commission is the "guardian" of the EC Treaty, and is respon-
sible for carrying out its objectives. Id. The Commission proposes legislation and most
articles in the EC Treaty require the Council of Ministers to act on the Commission's
proposals. Id. The physical make-up of the Commission consists of two Commissioners
from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and one Commissioner
from each of the remaining Member States. Id.
244. See Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 4 (explain-
ing that Information Society relates to EC information infrastructure and intellectual
property laws governing products and services in the European Community).
245. Id.
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Member State responses to new technologies. 46 Moreover, the
Commission states that the European Community must ensure
uniform opportunity for creators to market and exploit their
works in the highly technical environment. 47
The Council has responded to the changing technology by
adopting copyright directives.2 4  The Commission believes that
the Council needs to continue its response to technical advance-
ments and has advocated further harmonization of copyright law
to deal with Internet technology. 49  The Commission further
states that legal and regulatory certainty regarding Internet serv-
ices is an absolute prerequisite to the development of a strong
EC market based on the new technology.2 50
The Commission maintains that the traditionally high level
of intellectual property protection in the European Community
must continue even in the face of technological develop-
ments.2 51 In order to accomplish this task, the Commission pos-
tulates that lawmakers must meet the needs of the new market
without changing existing copyright concepts. 25 2 As such, the
Commission recommends only minor changes to EC copyright
regulations to accommodate the advancements in information
253services.
246. Id. The Commission fears that inconsistent national laws relating to new
technology will thwart the development of the Single Market. Id.
247. Id.
248. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (outlining Software, Rental Rights,
Satellite Broadcasting and Database Directives in field of copyright law).
249. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 8; see Internet
Communication, supra note 228, at 4 (stating that divergent Member State responses to
question of regulation of Internet services may lead to re-fragmentation of Single Mar-
ket); see also Kuhn, supra note 194, at 202 (stating that new technologies create need for
international copyright regulation).
250. Internet Communication, supra note 228, at 4-5; see Vinje, supra note 174, at
377 (stating that increased harmonization of copyright legislation results in more at-
tractive market for intellectual property).
251. Green-Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 8; see Vinje,
supra note 174, at 361 (stating intellectual property harmonization plan favors right-
sholders). EC institutions are attempting to harmonize intellectual property legislation,
while strengthening it at the same time. Id. In addition, Directorate-General XV ("DG
XV"), a branch of the Commission primarily responsible for proposing intellectual
property law, espouses a broad view of intellectual property protection and is in favor of
applying traditional principles of protection to new technologies. Id.
252. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 8.
253. Id.
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a. Reproduction Right
Presently, all Member States provide some sort of exclusive
reproduction right 25 4 of copyrighted material, but the national
provisions differ in scope and limitations of the reproduction
right.2 15 Furthermore, the international reproduction right, that
the Berne Convention sets forth, is subject to broad interpreta-
tion.25 6 The question facing the Commission is how to deter-
mine the extent to which electronic reproductions on the In-
ternet are violations of the exclusive reproduction right.25 7 The
Commission recognizes that a variety of computerized processes
may constitute reproduction 258 and, as such, wishes to eliminate
254. See, e.g., French Intellectual Property Code, Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992
[hereinafter French IP Code], art. L.122-3 (defining reproduction right). The French
IP Code provides:
Reproduction shall consist of a material fixation of a work by any and all meth-
ods that allow it to be communicated to the public in an indirect fashion. It
can be accomplished, notably, by printing, drawing, engraving, photograph-
ing, casting, and all processes of the graphic and plastic arts, or by mechanical,
cinematographic, or magnetic recording.
Id.
255. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 9.
256. Id. Article 9 of the Berne Convention, setting forth the reproduction right,
states:
1. Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall
have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any
manner or form.
2. It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.
3. Any sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction for the
purposes of this Convention.
Berne Convention, supra note 52, art. 9, at 8.
257. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 9.
258. Id. The Commission, exploring the reproduction right in light of advances in
technology, states:
In the Information Society... traditional forms of reproduction.., coexist
with a multitude of new forms of reproducing works.., such as scanning of a
printed work, or loading and/or storing of digitized material in a computer
memory .... Reproduction may also arise from incidental and ephemeral
acts which occur from normal use of an electronic system, for instance, when
transmitting material over.., the Internet. The question has arisen how far
such new acts of reproduction are covered by the traditional reproduction
right ....
Id.
As a result of an agreement reached at the December 1996 meeting of WIPO, in
Geneva, Switzerland, representatives from 160 countries clarified the scope of the re-
production right to a limited extent. Scheisel, supra note 20, at Al. The WIPO Per-
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present uncertainty within the European Community regarding
the scope of the electronic reproduction right. 59 The Commis-
sion cites the importance of this clarification for preventing ad-
verse effects on the growth of the Single Market.2 60
b. Right of Communication to the Public
The Commission appreciates the nature of digital technol-
ogy and understands that potential users of on-line services have
a myriad of information at their fingertips.2 6 1 The potential
users of on-line services represent members of the public, and,
as such, electronic transmissions, over such mediums as the In-
ternet, encompass more than private communication. 62 The
Commission, therefore, seeks to define the on-demand receipt
of digital information in terms of a right of communication to
the public. 63
formances and Phonograms Treaty states in article 7, "[plerformers shall enjoy the ex-
clusive right of authorizing the direct or indirect reproduction of their performances
fixed in phonograms, in any manner or form." WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, supra note 20, art. 7. Similarly, article 11 states, "[p] roducers of phonograms
shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the direct or indirect reproduction of their
phonograms in any manner or form." Id. art 11. The WIPO delegates further devel-
oped the reproduction right by stating:
The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention ...
fully appl[ies] in the digital environment, in particular for the use of works in
digital form. It is understood that the storage of a protected work in digital
form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning
of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.
Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic
Conference on Dec. 20, 1996, art. 1(4) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/
96dc.htm> [hereinafter Agreed Statements Concerning WIPO Copyright Treaty]; see
Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Dec. 20, 1996, arts. 7, 11 <http://
www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/96dc.htm> [hereinafter Agreed Statements Con-
cerning WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty] (outlining application of repro-
duction right of performances and phonograms in digital environment); see also
Scheisel, supra note 20, at Al (stating that drafters of agreement. refused to treat "tem-
porary computer copies automatically created to view graphics and other information
from the Internet" as violation of reproduction right).
259. Green-Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 11.
260. Id. at 10.
261. Id. at 12. A consumer using a personal computer is able to access, at any
given time, electronic transmissions of texts, software, phonograms, and databases. Id.;
see BaRAN, supra note 2, at 23-25 (discussing availability of electronic information on-
line).
262. Green-Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 12.
263. Id. Articles 11, 1lbis, and liter of the Berne Convention provide for the
right of communication to the public. Berne Convention, supra note 52, arts. 11-11 ter,
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The present law of the European Community does not pro-
vide an exclusive right to on-demand transmissions2 64 and most
of the Member States favor inclusion of such transmissions
under a broad right of communication to the public.2 65 The
Member States maintain that the additional right of communica-
tion to the public will safeguard privileges that the reproduction
right does not reach. 266 The Commission, therefore, is advocat-
ing the harmonization of the communication right, with little




The right of distribution gives creators the right to control
dissemination of their works.268 Rightsholders, however, may ex-
haust their distribution rights once they consent to public circu-
lation of their works.2 69 All Member States recognize a right of
distribution,2 70 and some of the copyright directives271 have par-
at 9-10. Article llbis(1)(ii) reads, "[a]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy
the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public by wire.. . ." Id.
art. 11bis, at 9. Article 1lter(1)(ii) reads, "[a]uthors of literary works shall enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of the recitation of their
works." Id. art. liter, at 10.
The WIPO Copyright Treaty sets forth, in Article 8, the Right of Communication to
the Public which addresses on-demand transmissions. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra
note 20, art. 8. Article 8 states:
authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authoriz-
ing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means,
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that
members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them.
Id.
264. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 14.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 13.
267. Id. at 14. The Commission favors keeping the present definition of public
and does not wish to redefine the term for the digital environment. Id.
268. Id. at 17.
269. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 17.
270. Id. The distribution rights differ in scope and limitations among Member
States. Id.
271. See, e.g., Rental Rights Directive, supra note 191, art. 9, O.J. L 346/61, at 64
(1992) (outlining distribution right). Article 9 states:
1. Member States shall provide for performers .... phonogram producers ...
producers of the first fixations in their films .... broadcasting organizations,
the exclusive right to make available [their works], including copies thereof,
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tially harmonized the distribution right.2 72 The Commission
proposes complete harmonization of the distribution right for
all types of copyrighted works.273 In addition, the Commission
asserts that the distribution right should not be exhausted with
respect to online services.274 The Commission maintains that a
lack of exhaustion of the distribution right regarding online
services is consistent with the ECJ's holding in Coditel v. S.A. Cine
Vog Films,275 which stated that courts should not apply the ex-
haustion principle to the provision of services with a Community
element.276
3. WIPO Treaties
The WIPO Copyright 277 and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms278 Treaties offer international responses to con-
cerns about copyright law in the digital age. 79 The WIPO Copy-
right Treaty set forth provisions outlining a creator's exclusive
right to control communications to the public that enable indi-
viduals to access the creator's works at a time and place chosen
by the accessing individual. 8 ° In agreed statements concerning
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the drafters concluded that the pro-
vision of facilities for making a communication does not amount
to a violation of the communication right.21s
The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty outlined
to the public by sale or otherwise, hereafter referred to as the distribution
right.
2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in
respect of an object as referred to in paragraph 1, except where the first sale in
the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or with his consent.
Id.; see also Software Directive, supra note 191, art. 4(c), O.J. L 122/42, at 44 (1991)
(enumerating distribution right).
272. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 17-18.
273. Id. at 19.
274. Id.
275. Id.; see Coditel, [1980] E.C.R. at 887 (explaining application of exhaustion
principle).
276. See Coditel, [1980] E.C.R. at 887 (holding that in order for court not to apply
exhaustion principle, provision of services must contain Community element).
277. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 20.
278. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 20.
279. West's Legal News Staff, WIPO Press Release No. 106, WLN, Jan. 16, 1997, at 1
[hereinafter Press Release 106).
280. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 20, art. 8; see supra note 263 and accompa-
nying text (discussing WIPO Copyright Treaty and conclusions regarding right of com-
munication to public).
281. Press Release 106, supra note 279, at 1; see Agreed Statements Concerning the
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provisions for the scope of artists' rights to authorize reproduc-
tions of their works282 and specified that storage of a perform-
ance or phonogram in digital form constitutes a reproduc-
tion. 83 Members of the online industry, who sought liberal
copyright laws,28 4 praised the treaties. 28 5 The online industry
was pleased that drafters decided to exclude, from the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, language labelling tem-
porary, transient, or incidental copies made on a computer as
reproductions.
28 6
B. Reconciling Standards of Infringement with the Internet
Lawmakers in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the European Community have not finalized legislation regard-
ing copyright infringement liability standards for OSPs.2 17 In
the United States, the Task Force argued in favor of applying
conventional liability standards to OSPs.2 18 Some U.S. legal
commentators opposed the position of the Task Force and advo-
cated limiting OSP liability to contributory or vicarious infringe-
ment standards. 2 9 In the United Kingdom, legal specialists have
predicted that U.K. courts will apply known copyright liability
principles to OSPs290 and that the policy concerns of each court
will determine the scope of such application. 91 In the Euro-
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 258, art. 8 (stating that provision of facilities to
make communication is not itself communication).
282. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 20, arts. 7,11; see
supra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing reproduction right set forth in
treaty).
283. Agreed Statements Concerning WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
supra note 258, arts. 7, 11.
284. West's Legal News Staff, Copyright Liberals Claim Victory on Recent WIPO Treaty
Decisions in Geneva, WLN, Dec. 27, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Copyright Liberals].
285. Id.
286. Id.; see Scheisel, supra note 20, at Al (discussing exclusion of language from
definition of reproduction).
287. See BNA, Inc., supra note 17, at 394-95 (explaining unsettled U.S. legislation
regarding OSP liability); INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 19 (stating that U.K. courts
have not addressed OSP liability); Internet Communication, supra note 228, at 13 (ac-
knowledging that lawmakers in European Community need to legislate on issue of OSP
liability).
288. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 114-24 (advocating application of current stan-
dards of copyright infringement liability to OSPs).
289. See, e.g., Carmichael, supra note 3, at 787 (arguing in favor of contributory
and vicarious liability standards for OSPs).
290. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at xii.
291. Id. at 19.
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pean Community, the Commission has stated that legislators
should impose liability on OSPs who directly place infringing
works online. 92 The Commission, however, has not yet deter-
mined the proper standard for OSP liability when third parties
upload infringing works." a
1. U.S. Proposals: White Paper and Commentary
Those in favor of limiting the liability of OSPs argue that
monitoring the OSPs will restrict access to information and pre-
vent the advancement of digital technology. 94 The Task Force,
however, fostered strong positions in favor of only minor modifi-
cations to the present system of copyright.2 95 Furthermore, the
Task Force postulated that, because OSPs are in the best posi-
tion to monitor infringing activities on their services,2 96 it is pre-
mature for legislators to hold OSPs to lower standards of liabil-
ity.297
a. Limiting Liability
Estimates indicate that trillions of bits298 of information
travel through computer networks each day. 99 Providers of
large online services cannot keep up with the high volume of
messages and files that users are uploading to their systems.80 0
Accordingly, an OSP's main argument against liability is the im-
possibility of detecting infringing materials on its networks. 0 1
Proponents of reduced liability contend that a legal require-
ment for increased bulletin board monitoring will cause BBS op-
292. Internet Communication, supra note 228, at 13.
293. Id.
294. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 407 (stating "imposing liability perpetuates
the pre-digitized distribution structures and prevents BBSs from ... becoming a mecca
of social participation and decentralization of power."); see also White Paper, supra note
2, at 115-16 (presenting arguments against OSP liability).
295. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 114-124 (arguing against reducing liability of
OSP).
296. Id. at 117.
297. See id. at 122 (stating "the Working Group believes it is, at best, premature to
reduce the liability of any type of service provider in the NII environment.").
298. See BARAN, supra note 2, at 232 (defining bit as one unit of digital informa-
tion). Eight bits constitute a byte. Id.
299. White Paper, supra note 2, at 116.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 115-16; see Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1376 (illustrating Internet
access provider's argument that it is impossible to screen large number of postings).
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erators to either limit the types of materials posted or totally re-
frain from running an online service. 0 2 These advocates main-
tain that copyright policy does not justify the results of increased
liability because heightened liability will restrict public access to
information.30 3 Furthermore, this view holds that laws should
only enforce the copyright owner's rights to the extent that pro-
tection advances the dissemination of information.3 0 4
Some legal opinions foster the view that lawmakers should
premise OSP liability on the contributory or vicarious liability
standards, and not on a theory of direct infringement.30 5 An
OSP generally does not upload or download the copyrighted ma-
terial onto the service.3 °6 An OSP's lack of direct participation
in file transfers makes it difficult to prove direct infringement.3 7
Conversely, under the contributory and vicarious standards, an
individual does not have to physically participate in the violation
of a copyright owner's exclusive rights for a court to hold that
individual liable."0 8 Thus, the opinions set forth that these crite-
302. White Paper, supra note 2, at 116; Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 406. In order
to decrease the cost of monitoring, online services might choose to post only materials
which they own or have a license to use. Id. In addition, OSPs predict that if the laws
expose them to liability for infringement, they will terminate their businesses, and
cause the eventual destruction of information superhighway. White Paper, supra note 2,
at 116. Similarly, the risk of liability, might discourage people from entering the online
host business in the first place. Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 406.
303. Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 408.
304. Id. The economic approach to copyright law is premised on a system which
insures an author's incentive to create by granting him exclusive rights to his creations.
JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 18-20. Such rights, however, limit the public's access to
the works. Id. at 18-19. The central problem lawmakers face is achieving a balance in
copyright law which maintains the author's incentive to produce new works without
unduly limiting dissemination to the public. Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 326.
The balance becomes distorted by new technology. GROVES, supra note 28, at 1. OSPs
and commentators fear that overregulation of the Internet will unfairly tip the scales in
favor of copyright owners and restrict the potential of online services to distribute infor-
mation to the public. Elkin-Koren, supra note 22, at 406-08; White Paper, supra note 2, at
115-16.
305. See, e.g., Carmichael, supra note 3, at 787 (advocating contributory and vicari-
ous standards of liability); Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1381 (holding that service
provider may not be directly or vicariously liable, but may be contributorily liable).
306. See BARAN, supra note 2, at 19 (stating that individuals use BBSs for posting
announcements and messages among subscribers); see also Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554
(citing service provider's contention that he never uploaded infringing images onto
BBS); Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1368 (stating that, other than maintaining online
service, OSP failed to take any affirmative actions to make infringing reproductions).
307. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1368-72 (discussing arguments against find-
ing direct liability of OSP).
308. See Carmichael, supra note 3, at 784 (discussing criteria for contributory in-
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ria are more applicable to the OSP. °9
Courts and legal commentators have adopted different in-
terpretations regarding the use of the vicarious and contributory
liability standards.3 10 For example, the court in Religious Technol-
ogy stated that the subscriber fee did not amount to direct finan-
cial benefit under the vicarious liability standard.3 1 1 This point
of view conflicts with a broader view of financial benefit.312 The
Task Force in the White Paper stated that online service provid-
ers have a business relationship with their subscribers.31 3 This
affiliation between the OSP and users may be the basis for a
judgment of an OSP's financial benefit.314 OSPs may financially
benefit from infringement because the prospect of uploading
and downloading infringing works induces users to pay for on-
line access.315
One legal commentator also introduced important ques-
tions regarding the contributory liability of the OSP.316 In Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,317 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that selling copying equipment does not constitute
contributory infringement if a consumer of the product can sub-
stantially use the product in non-infringing capacities.3 18 Analo-
fringement); Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686-87 (explaining defendant's role in infringing
activities); Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 (explaining requirements for court to find individual
vicariously liable).
309. See Carmichael, supra note 3, at 768 (distinguishing direct infringement of
BBS user from infringement by OSP). "The infringement analysis takes on a different
character when the defendant does not actually copy the plaintiff's protected work, but
rather provides a forum or an opportunity within which infringement takes place." Id.
Courts should, therefore, consider applying both contributory and vicarious standards
of liability to OSPs. Id. at 787.
310. Compare Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 687 (finding contributory infringement by OSP)
with Carmichael, supra note 3, at 785-86 (pondering courts' inability to find contribu-
tory infringement due to substantial non-infringing uses of online service); Religious
Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1377 (precluding possibility of vicarious liability because court did
not conclude that defendant received direct financial benefit) with Carmichael, supra
note 3, at 773 (suggesting that OSPs may receive direct financial benefit from users).
311. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1377 (explaining that fixed fee for access to
online service does not constitute direct financial benefit).
312. See Carmichael, supra note 3, at 772-77 (supporting broad construction of
financial benefit).
313. White Paper, supra note 2, at 117.
314. Carmichael, supra note 3, at 773.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 784-86 (stating "[c]ourts should rarely, if ever, apply the contributory
infringement doctrine to online service providers.").
317. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
318. Id. at 442. The Court in Sony found that the manufacturer's sale of videotape
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gizing the sale of copying equipment to the provision of an on-
line service, the commentator hypothesized that the non-infring-
ing uses31 9 of an online service might disqualify the OSP from
contributory liability.32 ° Thus far, however, the courts have
found that the legitimate uses of an online service have not im-
munized OSP's from contributory liability for copyright infringe-
ment.3
21
b. Maintaining Current Standards of Liability
The Task Force acknowledged that OSPs play an important
role in increasing dissemination of works and developing the in-
formation superhighway, but asserted that a reduced liability
standard for OSPs would substantially decrease the rights of
copyright owners.32 The Task Force addressed the argument
concerning the difficulty of screening uploaded files for infring-
ing works.323 Indeed, the Task Force conceded the virtual
impossibility of contemporaneous review of transmitted materi-
als. 3 24 The Task Force stated, however, that distributors of
books, records, and photographs experience similar levels of dif-
ficulty when prescreening their products,2 5 but they, neverthe-
less, may be held strictly liable for infringement.3 26
The Task Force also maintained that OSPs are in the best
position to halt infringement and that, as such, policy favors
holding the OSP liable.3 27 The OSPs have the ability to interact
recorders to the general public did not amount to contributory infringement of copy-
rights in television programs. Id. at 456.
319. See BAR.AN, supra note 2, at 23-25 (explaining vast array of online services);
Carmichael, supra note 3, at 786 (illustrating potential non-infringing uses of online
service).
320. Carmichael, supra note 3, at 785-86.
321. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1374-75 (holding that defendant's liability
for contributory infringement is contingent on defendant's notice of infringing post-
ings); Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686-87 (applying contributory infringement standard to de-
fendant).
322. White Paper, supra note 2, at 117.
323. Id. at 116.
324. Id.
325. See id. (stating that sellers of books, records, and computer programs cannot
analyze all books, records, or computer programs that they market).
326. White Paper, supra note 2, at 116. The Task Force added that OSPs, like other
businesses, incur expenses of doing business and need to develop ways to reduce liabil-
ity costs. Id. at 118.
327. Id. at 117. When notified of possible infringing activity on their service, the
OSPs are capable of taking necessary action to remedy the situation, and thereby re-
1997] COPYRIGHT LAWS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 1415
with the subscribers and influence their activity with marketplace
tools. 28 The Task Force asserted that the prospect of liability
may encourage OSPs to develop insurance plans, indemnifica-
tion and warranty agreements, subscriber education programs,
and technological innovations to track files.32 9
2. U.K. Commentary
Thus far, U.K. courts have not addressed copyright infringe-
ment liability of OSPs. °30 Legal specialists have speculated that
because U.K. law has specific provisions addressing electronic
copying,"3 1 the probability is high that U.K. courts will hold In-
ternet hosts liable for copyright infringement.332 One legal prac-
titioner advanced infringement theories based on vicarious lia-
bility, issuing copies to the public, and showing or playing the
work in public. 3 3
duce their liability for damages to those for innocent infringement. Id. at 116-117; see
id. at 125 (explaining that court may find innocent 'infringement when defendant
proves that he had no knowledge that activity violated copyright holder's rights); 17
U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) (1997) (stating "where the infringer sustains the burden of proving,
and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted infringement of copyright, the court ... may reduce the
award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200"). The Task Force also
addressed the Congressional determination that the innocent infringer provision allows
'protect[ion] against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated innocent
infringement . . . ." White Paper, supra note 2, at 119 (quoting H.R. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 159-60 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5775-76).
328. White Paper, supra note 2, at 123.
329. Id. The Task Force believes that if the law does not hold service providers
accountable for infringement, the copyright owners will suffer because the OSPs will
not have the incentive to implement new ideas to curb infringing activity on their sys-
tems. Id. Evidence of technological innovations to track infringing activity has already
surfaced. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1376 (discussing screening of uploaded
files). In Religious Technology, a computer expert asserted that "with an easy software
modification [the Internet access provider] could identify postings that contain particu-
lar words or come from particular individuals," thereby allowing the OSP to detect in-
fringing files based on their content or the individual who performed the uploading.
Id.
330. See INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 19 (explaining state of U.K. case law re-
garding Internet activities).
331. See 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 17, at 357 (providing specific provisions re-
garding electronic copying).
332. See INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 19 (explaining that courts might view stor-
age of copyrighted material on Internet host's computer as copying and hold OSPs
liable even if subscriber posted work); see also John Kavanagh, Watch Out For Those Web
Site Saboteurs, TIMEs (London), Sept. 11, 1996, at 13 (analogizing physical circulation of
copies posted on actual bulletin boards to downloading copies from web pages).
333. INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at 19. With regard to vicarious liability, Internet
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Because U.K. copyright law extends farther than U.S. law
with a specific provision including reproduction by electronic
means in the definition of copying, legal practitioners argue that
it is more likely that the United Kingdom will be in favor of im-
posing liability on an OSP.3 34 Indeed, U.K. scholars have noted
that suggestions of eliminating law on the Internet are products
of wishful thinking rather than rational analysis. 3 5 The more
appropriate question for U.K. lawmakers is based on the applica-
bility of present legislation to the information age and not on
whether limitations are necessary. 336 Much like the Task Force
in the White Paper,3 7 U.K. practitioners appear to be in favor of
applying known laws to deal with Internet technology.338 Legal
experts opined that lawmakers need only make minor changes
in U.K. copyright law to address the advances of the digital
age.3 3
9
The lack of case law relating to Internet infringement has
led to speculative ideas about the application of U.K. copyright
law to the newly developed technology.3 4° Accordingly, deci-
sions regarding the application of one form of liability over an-
other to OSPs will rest largely on the policy concerns of U.K.
courts.3 41 Indeed, policy will also control the decisions relating
hosts who cause works to be available for downloading may be susceptible to allegations
of authorizing infringement even if they do not know or have reason to believe that the
material is violating an individual's copyright. Id.
334. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (discussing high probability of In-
ternet host liability in United Kingdom); see also 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 17(2), at
357 (providing provision for electronic copying).
335. See INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at xi (stating that laws of each jurisdiction
apply to Internet). One commentator states, "the pan-political nature of the Internet
may in fact render it vulnerable rather than immune to the laws ofjurisdictions around
the world." Id.
336. See id. at xii (stating "[u]nless and until the existing law is found wanting
there should be a presumption against further legislation.").
337. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 116-24 (explaining Task Force's position in
favor of application of current liability standards to OSPs).
338. See Kavanagh, supra note 332, at 13 (illustrating point of view of U.K. legal
experts that only minor changes in copyright law are needed to adapt to Internet tech-
nology).
339. See Kavanagh, supra note 332, at 13 (stating that Stephen Digby, head of intel-
lectual property group at Withers Solicitors and Intellectual Property Rights Chairman
for Eurim parliamentary lobbying group, said that "current framework [of copyright
law] does not need drastic overhaul to accommodate the information society.").
340. See INTERNET LAw, supra note 4, at xi (discussing some uncertainties about
applying copyright law to Internet).
341. See id. at 19 (stating "[ift remains to be seen whether a U.K. court would take
COPYRIGHT LAWS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE
to how international organizations will handle copyright law on
the Internet.3 42
3. EC Commentary
The Commission recognizes the need for the European
Community to develop clear rules that govern liability of
OSPs.14 3 The Commission believes that OSPs, who directly
upload infringing material onto the Internet, should be liable
for copyright infringement. 344 The Commission, however, is not
settled on the scope of an OSP's liability when third parties
upload infringing works.345
The Commission discussed legislation requiring OSPs, upon
learning that infringing material is present on their service, to
take proper steps to remove the illegal files.346 As an alternative,
the Commission contemplated the effect of laws requiring OSPs
to block access to infringing files instead of removing them.347
Finally, the Commission advocated self-regulation of online serv-
ices and encouraged legislation implementing the use of hot-
lines whereby members of the public may inform OSPs of the
presence of copyright violations on an online service.348 The
Commission postulated that self-regulation by Internet users is
essential for the decentralized Internet environment and pro-
posed that legislators consider self-regulation on an interna-
tional level.3 49
One legal commentator supported the holding of the court
in Religious Technology350 and stated that courts should only im-
a similar public policy approach to that adopted by the court in [Religious Technology]
and refuse to find direct infringement for automatic copying occurring during storage
and onward transmission of infringing material resulting from a third party's actions
342. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 130-55 (discussing various international con-
cerns about achieving goals of copyright law under different legal regimes).
343. Internet Communication, supra note 228, at 25.
344. Id. at 13.
345. Id. The Commission recommends that lawmakers consider the question of
OSP liability in light of the European Community's goal of maintaining a common
market. Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 24.
346. Internet Communication, supra note 228, at 14.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 13, 25.
349. Id. at 14.
350. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (holding that OSP who knew of in-
fringing postings may be contributorily liable for copyright infringement).
141719971
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pose liability on OSPs when they know that infringing works are
on their services and they do nothing to stop the dissemination
of such material." 1 The author stated that a high standard of
liability would thwart the growth of computerized information
services.3 52 That commentator stated that OSPs are not techni-
cally able to police copyright infringement on the Internet and
argued in favor of decreased liability to reflect the state of tech-
nology.35
3
III. LEGISLATORS MUST TAILOR COPYRIGHT LAWS TO FIT
WITH ONLINE TECHNOLOGY
Lawmakers for the twenty-first century need to draft copy-
right laws to address issues created by the growth of online serv-
ices. 354 First, legislators should look to traditional copyright
principles to ascertain the scope of exclusive rights for the digital
age. Second, in order to ensure further development of com-
puterized information services, courts need to apply contribu-
tory and vicarious infringement standards to OSPs.
A. Lawmakers Must Base the Exclusive Rights of a Copyright Owner
in a Digital Environment on Conventional Copyright
Concepts
Legislators need not prematurely revamp the system of
copyright if traditional copyright concepts may properly insure
adequate protection of intellectual property in the information
age. Legislators may be open to ideas regarding the creation of
new exclusive rights, but at the same time, lawmakers must re-
spect classic copyright principles that have endured for centu-
ries.355 In support of this proposition, the Task Force in the
White Paper and the Commission determined that legislators
need only expand the existing exclusive rights of copyright own-
351. Maurits Dolmans & Annette Schild, Copyrights and the Internet: A European's
Perspective 13 (Apr. 1996).
352. Id. at 14.
353. Id.
354. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (discussing growth of online serv-
ices).
355. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing England's first copyright
act, passed in 1710, which addressed authors' rights).
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ers.3 5 6 Moreover, the members of WIPO signed two treaties357
that incorporated traditional exclusive rights into legislation ad-
dressing new technologies.358
Because the traditional reproduction right35 9 is broad
enough to encompass the transmission of works over online serv-
ices,36 ° legislators may conveniently apply the present right of
reproduction to the new technology. The drafters of the WIPO
Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties followed
the above reasoning when they expanded the definition of re-
production to include the storage of protected works in digital
form.361 Indeed, the drafters of the WIPO Copyright Treaty ex-
pressly stated that the reproduction right set out in the Berne
Convention applies in the digital environment.3 62 The signato-
ries of the treaties, using the conventional reproduction right as
a foundation, simply established boundaries regarding the scope
of the right. 6 3 Similarly, the delegates of WIPO tailored the ex-
isting right of communication to the public 64 to fit the online
environment.36
5
In the face of digitization, lawmakers may, in large part,
premise copyright laws on traditional notions, but they should
also be open to suggestions that will improve the distribution of
rights. The replacement of the exclusive right of distribution
with an exclusive right to control access 366 to copyrighted works
356. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that lawmakers need only fine tune
existing copyright law to address technological advances).
357. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that international repre-
sentatives drafted WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty at WIPO's December 1996 diplomatic conference in Geneva, Switzerland).
358. See supra notes 258, 263 (outlining WIPO's application of existing exclusive
reproduction and communication to public rights to new technology).
359. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (outlining reproduction right in
Berne Convention).
360. See Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM (96) 586 Final at 9 (discuss-
ing possibility of broad interpretation of reproduction right).
361. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (explaining WIPO's application of
reproduction right to works in digital form).
362. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of Berne
reproduction right).
363. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on scope of
reproduction right).
364. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (outlining communication to pub-
lic right set out in Berne Convention).
365. See supra note 263 (showing similarities between right of communication to
public set out in Berne Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaty).
366. See supra note 239 (describing right to control access to online works).
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represents such an improvement. Although the Task Force and
the Commission recommended that legislators apply the classic
distribution right to the new technology,367 some legal authors
contend that legislation, granting copyright owners the right to
control access to their works, is more suitable for the online envi-
ronment.3 68 A right of access appears to be more appropriate
for the online environment, which is ultimately premised on a
computer user's ability to gain admittance to information. 69
The right of distribution arguably forces individuals to wrongly
conceptualize online services as physical distributors of copy-
righted matter, instead of access providers to data files.37° Legis-
lators may, therefore, contemplate a slight deviation from ex-
isting copyright concepts and consider a right of access as an
alternative to the distribution right.
B. OSP Liability Based on Contributory and Vicarious Infringement
Standards Is Best Suited for the Online Environment
Legislators must find the optimum point of balance be-
tween the incentive to create and the dissemination of material
on the Internet.371 Lawmakers may do so by limiting the applica-
tion of the direct 72 infringement standard and instead promot-
ing theories of contributory 73 and vicarious3 74 liability of the
OSP. Indeed, recommending the above standards will not only
maintain equilibrium between the incentive and dissemination,
but will also assure proper advancement of technology without
367. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing Task Force's proposed
amendments to U.S. distribution right); Green Paper Follow-Up, supra note 17, COM
(96) 586 Final at 19 (stating that legislators should apply distribution right to online
services).
368. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text (advocating creation of right to
control access to copyrighted works for digital environment).
369. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (describing nature of online serv-
ices and possible access to various forms of information).
370. See Olswang, supra note 232, at 217 (stating that legal regimes must move
away from physical concepts when works exist primarily in non-physical forms).
371. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing competing consider-
ations of incentive to create and dissemination of works and their effect on copyright
legislation).
372. See supra notes 89, 153 and accompanying text (explaining doctrine of direct
or primary infringement).
373. See supra notes 116-17, 161-66 and accompanying text (outlining require-
ments for contributory or secondary infringement).
374. See supra notes 130, 171-72 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of vica-
rious infringement).
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thwarting the growth of the Information Superhighway. 75
1. Primary or Direct Liability of the OSP: Not Consistent with
the Spirit of Copyright Law
Because knowledge by the OSP of the infringing activity is
not material to a determination of direct infringement, 376 a di-
rect liability standard is manifestly unreasonable. A direct crite-
rion would unfairly subject OSPs to liability for infringement
that they could not prevent because the high volume of files
moved through an online service makes it impossible for OSPs
to monitor infringement on a system. 77 Moreover, the fear of
liability generated from the application of a primary or direct
infringement rule will unduly limit the spectrum of services avail-
able on the Internet.3 78 A direct infringement standard will re-
strict public access to works and thwart advancement of digital
technology.
Furthermore, the OSPs are not committing direct infringe-
ment. Indeed, the subscribers to the online service are commit-
ting direct infringement when they download or upload infring-
ing material to or from their computers. 379 Generally, OSPs only
maintain and operate online services that automatically store
and forward the users' messages.3 80
Because of the many online users that choose to remain
anonymous and the extreme difficulty of identifying infring-
ers,3 81 it is not unreasonable to target OSPs for indemnification.
Indeed, the Task Force in the White Paper stated that OSPs are
375. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (stressing importance of using new
computerized methods to disseminate information).
376. See White Paper supra note 2, at 115 (explaining lack of knowledge require-
ment for direct infringement under U.S. law); GROVES, supra note 28, at 54 (illustrating
that under U.K. law, knowledge is not element of primary infringement).
377. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text (describing arguments citing
OSP's difficulty in tracking files on online service).
378. See supra notes 302, 352 and accompanying text (discussing how increased
liability might hurt growth of online services).
379. See Carmichael, supra note 3, at 767 (maintaining that subscribers, by upload-
ing and downloading copyrighted materials, are committing acts of direct infringe-
ment).
380. See, e.g., Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1367-68 (discussing OSP's role of oper-
ating service which automatically makes copies of subscribers' uploaded files).
381. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 117 (illustrating that OSPs may be only indi-
viduals able to identify infringing subscribers).
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in the best position to prevent infringement.382  Regulations,
however, should not subject OSPs to liability based on a standard
requiring direct violation of a copyright holder's exclusive rights.
In support of this proposition, the Religious Technology court re-
fused to find an OSP liable under the direct criteria, arguing
that the OSP did not cause the infringement."' Moreover, the
Commission stated that the direct liability standard need only
apply to individuals who personally upload infringing material
onto the Internet. 84 The Commission, however, acknowledged
that the question of OSP liability, when third parties upload in-
fringing works, is more difficult to answer.3 85
Though the U.K. legislature provided for electronic copying
in the 1988 Act,3 86 the better alternative is to rely on the princi-
ples of secondary infringement. U.K lawmakers created the
electronic copying provision of the 1988 Act to deal largely with
the problem of incidental copies made of computer pro-
grams.38 7 In contrast, to specifically address digital transfer of
files, the U.K legislature introduced the secondary infringement
provision dealing with transmission of works by electronic
means.388 In addition, commentators have suggested that U.K.
courts might apply the reasoning in Religious Technology and re-
fuse to find direct infringement. 8 9
2. The Contributory (Secondary) and Vicarious Standards:
The Better Approach to OSP Liability
The less stringent standards of contributory or vicarious in-
fringement better serve the goals of copyright law while still al-
lowing a finding of liability for defendants like those found in
Playboy and Sega.3 90 The U.S. district courts in Playboy and Sega
382. See id. (stating that best policy is to hold OSP liable).
383. Religius Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
384. Internet Communication, supra note 228, at 13.
385. Id.
386. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (discussing application of U.K.
provision for electronic copying to Internet).
387. See GROVES, supra note 28, at 56-57 (explaining underlying premises of elec-
tronic copying provision).
388. See id. at 68 (stating "[t]he purpose of the additional subsection is to cover the
situation where a work is transmitted in digital form via a telecommunications system
with a view to its being received and stored at the other end.").
389. INERNET LAW, supra note 4, at 19.
390. See Dolmans & Schild, supra note 351, at 14 (arguing that court would un-
doubtedly find defendants in Playboy and Sega liable under lesser standard).
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found the defendants liable for direct infringement 9 1 when a
contributory or vicarious infringement standard would have suf-
ficed. The courts did not have to apply the law in such extreme
fashion.
a. Contributory or Secondary Infringement
Because the technology has not advanced to a stage where
OSPs are capable of tracking possible infringement on their serv-
ices, 9 2 a low threshold of liability that does not require knowl-
edge of infringing activity would unfairly compel the OSPs to
provide protection beyond their means. In contrast, the knowl-
edge requirement for contributory or secondary infringement
helps insure that OSPs will not be subject to liability for acts that
they could not prevent. In support of this proposition, a com-
mentator in the European Community argued that courts
should impose liability on OSPs only when the OSPs have actual
notice that infringement is occurring on their service and refuse
to take corrective action. 93 The legal scholar reaffirmed the
holding in Religious Technology394 and argued that increased lia-
bility would thwart the growth of computerized information serv-
ices. 95
A direct liability law will more than likely retard the growth
of the Internet by causing OSPs to limit services or, even worse,
avoid running online systems.3 96 In contrast, the Task Force in
the White Paper argued that a high standard of liability is neces-
sary to the development of technology that will help monitor
works on the Internet.397 The Task Force theorized that main-
taining the direct standard will spark OSPs to develop technol-
ogy and marketplace tools that will reduce their liability.398 A
391. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559; Sega, 859 F. Supp. at 687.
392. See Dolmans & Schild, supra note 351, at 14 (discussing present state of tech-
nology regarding ability to monitor copyright infringement on online service).
393. See supra note 351 and accompanying text (discussing role of notice in ascer-
taining OSP liability).
394. See ReligWU Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (holding that court may impose liabil-
ity on OSPs who had notice of infringing works on their services).
395. See supra notes 352-53 and accompanying text (arguing that liability standard,
which does not take into account OSPs' capabilities to track infringement, will hinder
growth of online services).
396. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (explaining possible limitations of
online service when heightened liability exists).
397. White Paper, supra note 2, at 123.
398. Id.
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better view, however, is that a strict standard of liability is not
needed to inspire new technology. In support of this argument,
legal commentators stated that market demands for access fees
will be the driving forces that cause the development of technol-
ogy to monitor a subscriber's use.3 99 Therefore, with market
forces in place, the need for a strict liability standard is no
longer obvious.
In addition, those afraid of reducing liability must also un-
derstand that knowledge under the contributory and secondary
standards is open to interpretation by the courts. Both the U.K
and U.S. courts, for example, employ a malleable test of knowl-
edge of infringing activity, allowing broad interpretations of
knowledge.4"' For instance, the Sega court concluded knowl-
edge when the OSP encouraged infringing activity.4"1 The court
did not require that the OSPs know exactly when subscribers
uploaded or downloaded the infringing materials. 40 2 Courts
will, therefore, have the power, if the situation demands, to cre-
ate strict precedents that drive OSPs to carefully supervise the
activities on their services and sufficiently protect copyright.
Finally, the contributory and secondary infringement provi-
sions are closely akin to the activities of an OSP. In order to
encompass the activities of the OSP under contributory or secon-
dary infringement, the courts would not have to stretch the pro-
visions very far. For example, under U.S. and U.K. law, a person
may be liable for contributory or secondary infringement by sup-
plying the means for infringement." 3 Similarly, OSPs, by oper-
399. See Dolmans & Schild, supra note 351, at 14 (stating "market forces, even
absent the threat to access providers of copyright infringement liability, will lead to the
development of technological solutions. After all, such technological solutions are
closely associated with efforts to develop new ways to meter and charge for a sub-
scriber's use of content, and will be of natural interest to access providers and copyright
owners alike.").
400. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (detailing knowledge requirement
under U.K. law); Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1374 (explaining requirement of no-
tice); Sega, 859 F. Supp. at 686-87 (illustrating U.S. courts' interpretations of knowl-
edge).
401. Sega, 859 F. Supp. at 687.
402. Id. at 686-87.
403. See Carmichael, supra note 3, at 784 (stating that provision of equipment
needed for infringement may amount to contributory infringement); Sega, 857 F. Supp.
at 686 (concluding that defendant's provision of facilities may result in contributory
infringement); 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 24, at 362 (outlining that acts of secondary
infringement may include providing means for making infringing reproductions).
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ating and maintaining online services are supplying a way by
which subscribers may produce infringing copies.
In addition, under the 1988 Act, an individual commits sec-
ondary infringement by transmitting copyrighted material in
digital form over a telecommunications system with knowledge
that copies of the work will be made upon receipt of the trans-
mission.404 The nature of an online service is such that subscrib-
ers may transmit copyrighted works over telephone lines for
downloading onto a user's computer °5 Accordingly, U.K.
courts might broadly construe transmitting copyrighted material
to encompass the operation and maintenance of an online ser-
vice by an OSP.
b. Vicarious Liability
The vicarious liability standard is suitable for OSPs because
the criteria automatically takes into account the advancement of
technology and the ability of OSPs to control online infringe-
ment. Vicarious liability, by its definition, presupposes that an
OSP is capable of supervising a subscriber's infringing activity.40 6
Implicit in a finding of vicarious infringement is the assumption
that an OSP has the technological capabilities to monitor copy-
righted material on the system. For example, the court in Reli-
gious Technology considered the question of vicarious liability in
light of evidence that modifications to the OSPs software would
have given the OSP the ability to track incoming postings.4"7 If
individuals, however, are not able to control the infringing ac-
tions of others, they cannot be found vicariously liable. Thus,
the vicarious standard does not unfairly require OSPs to track
infringing files beyond the reach of technology.
404. 1988 Act, supra note 139, § 24, at 362; see GROVES, supra note 28, at 68 (ex-
plaining that lawmakers added provision to address transmission of works in digital
form because 1988 Act already covered broadcasts and cable programs).
405. See BARAN, supra note 2, at 28 (explaining operation of online service and
subscribers role in obtaining information).
406. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (outlining U.S. standard of vicari-
ous liability); STONE, supra note 139, at 56 (discussing vicarious infringement under
U.K. law).
407. Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76; see supra note 131 and accompanying
text (explaining effect of evidence regarding technological capabilities to track files on
determination of OSP's control over subscribers).
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CONCLUSION
Legislators on the brink of the twenty-first century must de-
velop copyright laws to accommodate the continuing worldwide
expansion of online communications. The new computerized
methods of reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted
works are forcing lawmakers to consider the scope of protection
afforded to copyright owners. Specifically, government officials
from all over the world need to apply existing copyright princi-
ples and define the scope of a copyright owner's exclusive rights
in the digital environment. In addition, legislators and courts
must determine fair and equitable liability standards for OSPs.
OSP liability standards must reflect the state of technology and
OSPs' abilities to track infringement on their services. Courts
cannot hold OSPs to a direct liability standard of infringement.
Instead, in order to insure the growth of the Information Super-
highway, courts should impose infringement standards based on
the OSPs' knowledge of and ability to block access to infringing
works that appear on the Internet.
